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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONS
OF SOCIAL GROUP
William J. Schock December 1974 116 pages
Directed by: Fuad G. Baali, H. K. Dansereau, and K. A. Kalab
Department of Sociology Western Kentucky University
A set of categories for the analysis of definitions of
social group and a set of categories developed by the author
were compared to determine which set had the greater parsimony
and utility. The sets of categories were compared in order
to specify the areas of agreement and disagreement. The sets
of categories were applied to a sample of early European and
American sociologists' conceptions of social group and a sample
of 22 introductory sociology text definitions. Smh's inclu-
sion of non-human individuals, one-way communication, and non-
contemporaneous group members in his set of categories was
unsupported by the samples of definitions. The combination
of Smith's categories, "shared goal dispositions" and 'norms
regarding means," into the author's category, "shared goal
dispositions," and Smith's categories, "role differentiation"
and "intergroup relations and group representative roles,"
into the author's category, "role differentiation," received
some support from the samples of definitions. Smith's cate-
gories, "mutual need satisfaction," "face-to-face interaction,"
and "socioemotional relations among group members" were not
cited in any of the samples. The author's category, "social




The importance of definitions in sociology has long
been viewed as essential to the development of the discipline.
The problem of defining terms has been doubly compounded by
the fact that many of the terms used in sociology are also
found in everyday language. Enile Durkheim recognized this
problem in searching for a sociological definition of the
term suicide. He states that definition is difficult
because suicide is a common term and “susceptible of more
,1
than one meaning. In order to avoid misunderstanding,
the sociologist must clearly state the things which fall
within the meaning of the term. Without a clear and precise
definition, scientific investigation has little chance of
success.
2
Two additional problems are implied by the need for
precision. The definition should include only the elements
necessary to identify the thing defined, and these elements
must be determined through agreement. Paul H. Furfey states
that an adequate definition should contain only the minimum
1
Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology,
trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (New York:





number of elements necessary to clearly identify the term.3
Timasheff cites the problem of agreement RS central to the
formulation of adequate definitions in sociology. Unlike
definitions in the physical sciences, definitions in sociology
are more often the subject of dispute than of agreement.
Controversy over the elements to be included within a def-
inition stifles the development of sociological theory and
directs research to fruitless invest1gations.4 Timasheff
argues that the extent of conceptual agreement is a good
indicator of the maturity of a science.5 Robert Bierstedt
mentions that the advantage of a committee within the Amer-
ican Sociological Association which formulated standard
definitions was that ultimately it "could . . . contribute
to the linguistic facility and accuracy of sociological
n6communication.
Acknowledging that the comparative analysis of def-
initions can aid in the determination of the extent of agree-
ment and utility of definitions, the decision remains as
to which concepts are of prime importance in sociological
3Paul Hanley Furfey, The Scope and Method of Sociology:
A Metasociological Treatise (New York: Gooper Square Pub-
lishers, Inc., 1965), p. 120.
LI-Nicholas S. Timasheff, "Definitions in the Social
Sciences," American Journal of Sociology 53 (November 1947):
202.
5Idem, "The Basic Concepts of Sociology," American
Journal of Sociology 58 (September 1952): 176.
6
Robert Bierstedt, "Nominal and Real Definitions in
Sociological Theory," in L. Gross, ed., Symposium on Socio-
logical Theory (New York: Row & Peterson, 1959), p. 131.
3
investigations. "social group" is one of the most basic
concepts in sociology and one of the oldest. It is a specific
arena of sociological inquiry. Other disciplines such as
physiology and anatomy deal with man as an individual.
?sychology,insofar as it specifically deals with the phys-
ical and biological responses of the body, treats human
beings as individuals. It is caly when our concern extends
beyond the individual that we enter the realm of the social.
Groups and group-like phenomena make up the social world
and, as such, are the subject matter of sociology. It has
even been asserted that "every bona-fide sociological con-
cept deserves that adjective only because of its group
connection." Yet, the term was in common use long before
the advent of the science of sociology. A comprehensive
set of elements derived from common experience was already
associated with the term. Sociologists incorporated many
of these elements within their own definitions of social
group. This has contributed to the misunderstanding of
which Durkheim warned. According to Charles K. warriner,
"despite its ,'The term, group 7 antiquity, there is little
agreement on the nature of the reality to which it refers.
with the definition of social group or, more gen-
erally, group, there is a special problem. This term is
!I d
7Robert J. DuBois, "A Comparative Analysis and
Criticism of Theories of Social Groups in Modern American
Textbooks" (Master's Thesis, Wayne University, 1951), p. 1.
8
Charles K. Warriner, "Groups are Real: A Reaffirmation,"
American Sociological Review 21 (October 1956): 549.
4
commonly used to refer to many different realities. People
of a certain age, sex, or religion are sometimes called a
group. A collection of animals is sometimes called a group.
Even a number of inanimate objects are sometimes calleu a
group. Although sociologists agree that the definition should
be confined to people and that interaction is an important
element, they "are not at all agreed on which collectivities
'119they wish to include or exclude in using the term 'group.
Social group has been defined so that it includes primarily
the type of group referred to RS R "small group." According
to Smith,
Defining groups in this restricted manner ignores
some very important similarities between small
informal groups and such other grouplike entities
as formal organizations, 'collective behavior,'
or national states. 1°
Others maintain that there are sufficient similarities
between larger associations and small groups so that both
fall within the denotation of the term social group. For
example, E. T. Hiller asserts that the community is a
social group. In his view,
4 group is a social system comprising identifiable
elements which are also found in the composition
of an analytical community, so that the latter may
be regarded as a type of social group amenable to
analysis by methods suitable to the study of social
groups in genera1.11
9Donald W. Olmsted, "A Developmental Model of the
Social Group," The Sociological owarterly 3 (July 1962): 195.
10 
David Horton Smith, "A Parsimonious Definition of
'Group:' Toward Conceptual Clarity and Scientific Utility,"
Sociological Inquiry 37 (Spring 1967): 143.
11
E. T. Hiller, "The Community as a Social Group,"
American Sociological Review 6 (April 1941): 169.
5
However, the disagreement on the meaning of social group
does not itop here. Social group has been defined with
such a wide scope as to include almost any type of social
relation. Sometimes it has not been distinguished from
human beings who are merely in spatial proximity to one
another or who share a similar physical or social character-
1')
istic. -
Despite the lack of agreement on this pivotal defin-
ition, few investigations have dealt with the analysis of
the various definitions of social group employed in sociology.
Marie L. Borgatta made a brief examination of the concept
as it was used by early European and American sociologists.
13
Nicholas S. Timasheff included the term along with several
others in an analysis of definitions found in treatises and
texts between 1931 and 1951.14 Most recently, David R.
Smith conpared definitions from sociological and non-socio-
logical sources with his own definition.
15
There are, in
short, two reasons for this study. It is made in order to
supplement the paucity of investigations in this area. It
is also made to accomplish that requirement of science which
demands that concepts be continually reexamined.
1 
2Smith, "Parsimonious Definition of 'oroup": 143.
' Marie L. Borgatta, "The Concept of the Group: A
Brief Consideration," Sociology and Social Research 43
(November 1968): 83-89.
14Timasheff, "The Basic Concepts of Sociology":
176-186.
15Smith, "Parsimonious Definition of tGroup":
141-167.
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The Purpose of the Study
The primary focus of this thesis is to compare a 3et
of categories for the analysis of definitions of social group
developed by David H. Smith with a set of categories developed
by the author. The author reviewed Smith's set of categories
and found several which. he felt could be modified or omitted.
Throughout the thesis the two sets of categories will be
compared and contrasted to the conceptions of social group
of selected early European and American sociologists as







sample of definitions of social group from
texts in sociology. The agreement between both
the author's sets of categories and various con-
social group will be determined. In addition,
will review and compare the conceptions of social
the time of Auguste Comte. The definitions will
to determine the areas of agreement and disagree-
ment among sociologists on the nature of social group.
The Procedure
Chapter two cites the work of David H. Smith on the
definitions of social group. The categories used in his
analysis will be described and compared to a sot of categories
derived by the author. Chapter three is divided into two
sections. Part A deals with the various conceptions of
social group among the early European sociologists. The
thoughts of the following men are examined: Auguste Comte,
Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Toennies, Max Weber,
7
and Georg Simmel. Part B deals with the early American
sociologists. This section is concerned with the conceptions
of Lester Ward, Franklin Giddings, Charles H. Cooley, George
H. Mead, E. A. Ross, William G. Sumner and Pitirim A. Sorokin.
At the conclusion of each section dealing with the conception
of a particular sociologist, a comparison is made of the
agreement between Smith's and the author's sets of categories
and the conception of that sociologist. Finally, a determin-
ation will be made of the extent of agreement among the early
European and American sociologists on the nature of social
groups.
Chapter four analyzes and compares the definitions of
social group found in introductory sociology texts published
between 1964 and 1973. These texts would most likely reflect
the present understanding of the definitions. In addition,
they have--as one of their purposes--the definitions of key
concepts within the discipline. The sample which was
selected consists of only those texts which have more than
one edition. It is the author's contention that texts with
more than one edition would be the ones with the widest use.
The index of texts is obtained primarily from the Subject 
Guide to Books in Print 1973.
16
This chapter is divided
Into three parts. Part A is devoted to the definitions of
social group alone. Each definition is examined to determine
which elements the texts consider essential to social groups.
16
Subject Guide to Books in Print 1973: An Index to
the Publishers Trade List Annual, Vol. 3 (New York: R. R.
Bowker Co., 1973).
6
Part B applies the categories on which Smith and the author
are in disagreement to the sample of definitions. This is
done in order to avoid redundancy in ?art C. If a defi-
ciency is found in any of Smith's categories, the defin-
ition is then compared to the author's set of categories
to determine if they contain the same deficiency. Part C
applies the author's set of categories to the sample of
definitions of social group. In this Dart a determination
is made of the extent of agreement in the texts on the
elements to be included in the definition of social group.
The conclusion of this chapter again examines the sets of
categories derived by Smith and the author in order to
determine which set of categories provides fa better "fit"
with the definitions in the texts.
The discussion in chapter five centers around a brief
examination of the utility of Smith's and the author's sets
of categories. Conclusions derived in the course of the
study are presented. Finally, there is a discussion of the
nature and extent of the development of the conceptions of
social group since the time of Comte.
CHAPTER II
A COMPARISON OF THE :RESENT STUDY WITH SMITH'S SET
OF CATEGORIES FOR THE ANALYSIS
OF DEFINITIONS OF SOCIAL GROUP
The purpose of the article by David H. Smith was to
determine "the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
occurrence of 'group like phenomena,'" and to incorporate
these "into a precise but general definition of the term
'group. '"1 In order to accomplish this objective, he
examined the elements which have been included in the
definition of group. His data were collected in a hap-
hazard fashion and the presentation of the rusults was
brief. He lists the elements which were included in the
different definitions and compares them to his own defin-
ition of social group. Partly on this basis, he maintains
that his definition meets tne criteria of "parsimony, con-
ceptual clarity, and scientific utility.
But does the haphazard nature of his collection of
definitions disqualify his sample as representative? Would
1
David H. Smith, "A Parsimonious Definition of
'Group:' Toward Conceptual Clarity and Scientific Utility,"





his categories be found in a representative sample of
definitions? Does his definition actually satisfy the
three criteria mentioned above? These are the questions
which will be examined in this chapter and the chapters
that follow.
Smith utilized dictionaries, taxts, and articles.
He did not confine himself solely to sociological definitions
but drew his data from psychological and social psychological
sources. Also, as he states, "The intention is not to derive
theory through summary or synthesis of common definitional
parlance, but rather to elicit the major elements that have
been used in defining group. This author does not agree
with Smith's utilization of sources other than textbooks.
Dictionaries of sociology do contain definitions of social
group but there are too few such dictionaries to give a
representative picture of the elements of a social group.
Also, research articles may define social group operationally,
that is, in terms of the purposes of the particular article,
rather than in general.
If Smith is a sociologist, writing in a sociological
journal for other sociologists, should he not have used
sources from within the field alone? This is not to dis-
count the importance of contributions from other fields but
rather to emphasize that a definition of social group for
use by sociologists should be drawn primarily from the
3Ibid., p. 144.
11
context of sociological theory and convey the general under-
standing of sociologists on the meaning of the term. This
is not to discount the possibility that Smith might have
intended to make his "sample" comprehensive. Finally, it is
the author's contention that some agreement on the definitions
of social group can be found in introductory sociology texts
and that these texts can be selected to insure representative-
ness.
Smith cites thirteen categories which he used in his
analysis of the definitions of social group. These categories
are: (1) the largest set of two or more individuals; (2)
a network of relevant communications; (3) a shared sense of
collective identity; (4) one or more shared goal dispositions
with associated normative strength; (5) face-to-face inter-
action; (6) norms regarding means; (7) action; (8) duration;
(9) external perception of group identity or membership;
(10) socioemotional patterns among group members; (11)
mutual neea satisfaction; (12) intergroup relations and group
representative roles; (13) role d1fferentiation.4 In
reviewing these categories the author encountered several
which he felt should be modified or eliminated. The categories
which were derived and their relation to Smith's categories are
described below.
Two or More Individuals
Smith' s category of "the largest set of two or more
individuals ' included the notion that only the largest set
4Ibid., pp. 141, 156.
le
could rightly be called the group. In 0,mith's view the group
includes not only individuals who are members but also those
who were members or will become members. This leaves the
sociologist with the prospect of "studying in most cases
partial groups rather than complete groups."5 In the
author's category, two individuals may be a group despite
the fact that the sole basis of their interaction is member-
ship in a larger group. Therefore, included under the aspect
of "two or more" are such terms as "plurality," -a number of,"
or "many." This is because these terms imply a minimum of
two individuals.
smith used the term "individual - to mean that a group
may consist of non-human individuals. The author agrees that
this is "an interesting empirical question."6 Nevertheless,
it is the author's position that this category should include
only those elements which are accepted as fact and not those
open to question. In the author's category, the term indi-
vidual refers solely to human beings.
Interaction
Instead of "interaction' smith used the category
/Ia network of relevant communications." In Smith's category
communication may be one-way. This is linked with his notion
that a group may be composed of two members whose one-way





agrees with Smith, then it is possible for a group to be
formed when one individual reads the work of some long-
deceased philosopher. A group would be formed when the
individual reacts to the work by identifying with the
goals of that philosopher. In this instance, the time
span is great and communication is definitely one-way.
7
The author's category "interaction" includes the notion
of two-way communication. Only present, living members
will be included. Past members were part of the group,
but they are not now. Future members will be part of the
group but they are not now. Thus, Smith's category "a
network of relevant communications" is not used by the
author because the author feels that it is too broad.
Shared Sense of Collective Identity
Smith included the following elements under this
category. Each group member
. . . (a) believes himself to be a member of (or
participant in) some collective entity, and (b)
believes that there is at least one other indivi-
dual in space-time who also views himself as a
member of that same collective entity and Who In
turn believes in the existence of other members.0
hIle the author accepts the first part of Smith's definition
of this category, in the author's category of the same name
a group member must know another member and not simply
believe that there is another member who exists somewhere




because he felt that it was too broad to have utilit
y. The
group members in the author's view must exist simult
aneously.
The author's category also includes Franklin H. Gidding
s'
concept of "consciousness of kind" which "is a state of
consciousness in which any being recognizes another consc
ious
9
being as of like kind. 
If This conce;t is not used by Smith.
Shared Goal Dispositions with Associated 
Normative Strength 
This category is included as stated by Smith. It
refers both to "the tendency to prefer or want some 
end-
state or configuration of events," and to "some sign
ificant
moral feeling, a sense of social duty, 'oughtness,' consc
ience
or internal obligation. 
10
This category is teleological in
character and implies the Dresence of norms. Norms 
direct
the individual toward group goals. Smith also acknowledg
es
that the necessity of at least one norm has been ac
cepted
when it came to the shared goal dispositions of the gro
up.
,11
Nevertheless, he includes norms under the separate
 category
of "norms regarding means." The author has combin
ed Smith's
categories of 'shared goal dispositions" and 'norms 
regarding
means" to form his own category, "shared goal discositi
ons.
Role Differentiation 
Both the author and Smith use the category of "role
9Nicholas S. Timasheff, Sociological Theory: Its 
Nature and Growth, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1967),
P. d3
10
Smith, "Parsimonious Definition of 'Group'": 148.
"Ibid., p. 158.
I
differentiation." Smith used this category to refer solely
to the division of labor. However, the author feels that the
division of labor implies the presence of a hierarchy.
Therefore, the author's category refers not only to the
division of labor but also to superordination/subordination,
that is, the presence of leaders and followers. Smith placed
the latter conception under the category of "intergroup
relations and group representative roles."
Social Structure
This category was added by the author and is not used
by Smith. The author felt that if a sociologist accepted
the notion of "duration" as used by Smith and the author,
he was also likely to include the notion that interaction
over time becomes patterned, that is, a structure develops.
The author's category allows for the possibility of a formal
or informal structure.
Categories Retained or Deleted
The categories of "Duration," "Action," and 'External
Percevtion of Group Membership" are included in the author's
set of categories in the same sense as used by Smith. Only
the elements contained in epch category will be mentioned.
"Duration" refers to the tendency of a group to persist in
time. "Action" means the overt behavior of individuals
within the group. ''External Perception of Group Membership"
means that the group must be able to be observed by indi-
viduals outside of it. Smith's category of "Face-to-Face
Interaction" was not used in the author's set of categories
lb
since this pertains principally to the primary group. The
primary group Was defined by Charles H. Cooley as:
A group of from two to possibly fifty or sixty
people--i.e., a small number--who are in rela-
tively lasting face-to-face association for no
single purpose, but merely as persons rather than
as specialized functionaries, agents or employees
of any organization.12
qmith's category of "Face-to-Face Interaction" would therefore
limit the generality of definition to one type of social
group. The category "SocioemdAonal Patterns among Group
Members" was deleted from the author's set of categories
since group membership does not necessarily imply affective
bonds. For example, a relationship may be based on the
fulfillment of a contract. In this case the attitude of group
members toward one another may be one of indifference. Finally,
Smith's category "Mutual Need Satisfaction" was not used in
the author's set of categories. The satisfaction of needs
affects the continuance of a member in a group. However,
the conviction that needs will be satisfied leads individuals
to join a group. Once a member, an individual may find that
his needs are not satisfied. For example, an individual may
join a religious community because he feels that he will
find spiritual satisfaction within it. If he does not find
It, he may still remain in it for a period of time in order
to make sure that he has given the community a chance to
satisfy his needs.
12
Idem, Robert C. Angell, and Lowell J. Carr, Intro-




Table I presents the differences between Smith's and
the author's sets of categories. Although the two sets of
categories are similar, they differ in the areas cited in
Table I. In the following chapters the conceptions of social
group held by selected early European and American sociologists,
as well as the definitions of social group from a sample of
introductory sociology texts, will be applied to the sets of
categories of Smith and the author. The objective of these
chapters will be to determine which of the two sets of cate-




THE ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN SMITH'S AND THE AUTHOR'S
CATEGORIES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONS
OF SOCIAL GROUP
Smith's Category The Author's Category
THE LARGEST SET OF TwO OR
MORE INDIVIDUALS
7:0 OR MORE INDIVIDUALS
A complete group is made up
of all individuals in space-
time who were, are, or will
become members. Individuals
may be non-human.
A group is formed by two or
more human individuals who
exist simultaneously.
A NETWORK OF RELEVANT
COMMUNICATIONS
INTERACTION
Communication may be one-way
or two-way and can take
place between distant
generations.
Communication must be recipro-
cal or two-way. 1ttakes
place between individuals who
exist simultaneously.
SHARED SENSE OF COLLECTIVE
IDENTITY
SHARED SENSE OF COLLECTIVE
IDENTITY
1. The group member must
know another existing member
of the same collective entity.
2. An individual must only
believe that another group
member exists some4here. He
does not have to know him.
The other individual does not
have to exist in reality.
The first losition is accepted.
The second osition is not
accepted. Giddings' concel t
of consciousness of kind is
included within this category.
ONE OR MORE SHARED
GOAL DISPOSITIONS
ONE OR MORE SHARED
GOAL DIS.e0SITIONS
The tendency to prefer some
end sate of events and an
associated feeling of
internal obligation.
Includes both the meaning of
Smith's category of the same








(continued on nage 19)
TABLE I (continued)
THE ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN SMITH'S AND THE AUTHOR'S
CATEGORIES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONS
OF SOCIAL GROU?
Smith's Category The Author's Category
NORMS REGARDING MEANS
Informal or formal rules
which direct the behavior
of group members.
Not used as a separate
category. Included under the
author's category of "one or
more shared goal dispositions.
ACTION ACTION
Overt behavior of individuals Same as Smith.
within the group.
DURATION DURATION
The tendency of a group to Same as Smith.
persist in time.
EXTERNAL PERCEPTION EXTERNAL PERCEPTION
OF GROUP IDENTITY OF GHOUL-) IDENTITY
Groups can be observed by Same as Smith.
individuals outside of them.
SOCIOEMOTIONAL PATTERNS Not used.
AMONG GROUP ',EMBERS
!.lutual social relations of
friendliness or tension
release.
MUTUAL NEED SATISFACTION Not used.
The fulfillment of physical or
psychosocial requirements of
group members by others in the
group.
INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND Not used by itself. Included
GROUP REPRESENTATIVE ROLES 777h1R—The author's category
of "role differentiation."The presence of a hierarchy
in which some lead and
othel's follow.
(continued on page 20)
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TABLE I (continued)
THE ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN SMITH'S AND THE AUTHOR'S
CATEGORIES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONS
OF SOCIAL GROU?
Smith's Category The Author's Category
ROLE DIFFERENTIATION ROLE DIFFERENTIATION 
Division of labor or Includes both Smith's category
differential task allocation, of the same name and his
category of "intergroup
relations and group represen-
tative roles."
Not used. SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The pattern of internal organ-
izption of the group. It may
be either formal or informal. 
CHAPTER III
EARLY EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEFINITIONS
In this chapter an attempt will be maue to show the
overall development of the concept of social group. The
conceptions of social group held by selected early European
and American sociologists will be discussed and compared to
each other as well as to Smith's and the author's sets of
categories for the analysis of definitions of social group.
In order to make the most effective comparison among the
conceptions of the early socioloyists and Smith's and the
author's sets of categories, this chapter is divided into
two parts. Part A deals with selected early European sociolo-
gists. Part B discusses the conceptions of selected early
American sociologists. At the conclusion of each section
dealing with the conception of a particular sociologist, a
comparison will be made between that conception and the sets
of categories of Smith and the author. The purpose of the
comparison is to determine which of the two sets of cate-
gories more closely embraces the conception of social group
of the sociologist studied.
Part A: Early European Conceptions of Social Group 
Auguste Comte
Comte views all forms of social collectivities as
similar to organisms. The various parts comprising the social
21
22
organism, whether it is a family or the whole society, are
interdependent. 'Athout the interdebendence of pRrts the
organism could not survive. In Comte's words, "There must
always be a spontaneous harmony between the whole and the parts
of the social system, the elements of which must inevitably
be, sooner or later, combined in a mode entirely conformable
to their nature. "
1 
The basic units which make up society are
families. It is in these two notions of family and society
that Comte's conception of the nature of social groups can
be found.
Building on the thought of Aristotle, Comte asserts
that all collective organization from the family to society
manifests a division of labor and cooperation which cannot
be separated. These two elements are found in the funda-
mental social unit, the family, and develop with the coor-
dination of efforts between families. Comte argues that
coo eration in modern society is rooted in the division of
labor. The division of labor Iroduces both solidarity
through the interdeoendent needs which it fosters and the
complex form of the modern social organism.3 However,
Comte also regards the division of labor as possessing
Ita natural tendency to extinguish the sense of community, or
1
Auguste Comte, "The Science of Society," in Varieties
of Classic Social Theory, ed. Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek Tiew
York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1963), ,. 42.
Auguste Comte, Sociologie: Textes Choisis (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), pp. 55,56.
3George Slim son, Auguste Comte: Sire of Sociology 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1969), pt . 30-bl.
"6qt leqst seriously to impair it. The danger lies in over-
specialization which can lead to fragmentation of societal
components. This tendency toward dissolution is checked by
the natural inclination toward control and authority. Comte
contends that "the most important of all the properties of
society, beyond cooperation and division of labor, are its
basic subordination and tendency toward government. .17
In sum, Comte views social collectivities as organisms
consisting of interdependent parts. The parts have separate
functions which are interrelated to form a harmonious whole.
geparate functions are determined by the division of labor
and unified toward a common goal by cooperation. Finally,
the possible detrimental effects of the division of labor
are kept under control by authority which naturally manifests
itrelf.
Comte conceives of social groups as being composed of
human individuals alone. This is more in accord with the
author's set of categories than with Smith's. Comte does not
consider a group to be made up of "the largest set of two or
more individuals" which would match gmith's category. Rather,
his organismic approach emphasizes the existence of inter-
dependent groups within society without regard to their
relative sizes. His conception is thcs more consistent
with the author's category of "two or more individuals"
teven Lukas, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work (New
York: Harper and Now, Pa., 1972), p. 141.
7Don Martindale, The Nature and T es of gociolo ical




because it does not contain the notion of "the largest set."
Comte's notion of cooperation implies the presence of two-
way communication which is contained in the author's category
of "interaction." Comte's conception of social group was not
included under Smith's category of "a network of relevant
communications" because of Smith's inclusion of the element
of one-way communication within his category. Smith uses
the notions of the division of labor and superordination/
subordination in the categories of "role differentiation"
and "intergroup relations and group representative roles"
respectively. Comte's conception combines these two notions.
Authority exercised by leaders acts as a check on overs,ecial-
ization engendered by the division of labor. The author
also combines these two notions in his category of "role
differentiation." Finally, the division of labor in modern
society is, in Comte's view, contractual. Such a relationship
can be non-emotive. Thus, Comte's conception cannot be
placed under Smith's category of "socioemotional patterns
among group members." This category is not used by the
author.
Herbert Spencer
Spencer also takes an organismic approach to t'ae
study of society. However, S,encer relies on the analogy
of the organism to a greater extent than Comte. Throughout
his writings there are continual comparisons between the two.
For example, in Social Statics he compares the social




ST,encer also differs from Comte in that he
considers the primary social unit to be the individual and
not the family. But Spencer does not consider the indivi-
dual in a state of isolation. Rather he views him in his
relations with other individuals and with society. Thus he
argues that
the essence of the social process is the interaction
between individuals and society, between units and
the mass, and their adaptation as a result of the
adjustment of the natures of men to society and of
the social organization to the nature of its consti-
tuent units.9
In The Study of Sociology he maintains that one of the aims
of sociological inquiry is "to trace, in societies of some
size, the genesis of the social relations, regulative and
,
operative into which members fall."
lk
 " Because of this
orientation to the individual, Spencer's at roach is closer
to a social psychology of social relations.
Spencer agrees with Comte that the two principal
elements in any social collectivity are the division of
labor and cooperation. For Spencer, however, it is cooper
ation
rather than the division of labor which makes for social
entities. This emlhasis on cooperation also appears in
The :rinciLles of Sociology. In the first volume of this
work, Spencer rovides a definition of the simpler peoples
6
J. D. Y. leel, Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a
Sociologist (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971), 0. 174.
9Jay Rumney, Herbert Spencer's Sociolou (New York:




which avoids the notion of the division of labor. In his
words, this basic group is "one which forms a single working
whole unsubjected to any other, and of which the parts
co-operate, with or without a regulating centre, for certain
public ends."
11
Spencer's interpretation of the division of
labor is that it produces groups or society through the
exchange of services in the gratification of self-interest.
It is a contractual relationship which predominates. Spencer
does not regard the spatial proximity of individuals as the
starting point of society:
A society in the sociological sense, is formed only
when, besides juxtaposition there is cooperation.
So long as members of the group do not combine their
energies to achieve some common end or ends, there
is little to keep them together. They are prevented
from separating only when the wants of each are better
satisfied by uniting his efforts with those of others
than they would be if he acted alone.12
Comte and spencer hold similar views on the nature of social
groups. They differ in their estimation of the relative
importance of the division of labor and cooperation. They
differ most radically in that Comte conceives of authority
as the "glue" which holds groups together whereas Spencer
finds it in the satisfaction of individual self-interest.
Both Spencer and Comte emphasize the presence of cooper-
ation and the division of labor in the group. The comments in
the section on Comte on the applicability of Smith's and the
11
Rumney, Herbert Spencer's Sociology, p. 72.
12
Herbert Spencer, The Evolution of Society: Selections 
from Herbert Spencer's "Princlples of Sociologyl  ed.
llobert L. Carneiro (Chicago: The University of - Chicago Press,
1967), p. 63.
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author's categories to these elements are also valid for
Spencer's conception. Spencer does not supplement the divi-
sion of labor with the notion of superordination/subordination.
This is closer to Smith's category "role differentiation" which
includes only the division of labor and not the author's
category "role differentiation" (see Table I). Although
Spencer asserts that the basic sociological unit is the
individual in his relations with society, this is still
ultimately a relationship among individuals. Spencer speaks
only of human individuals and does not refer to Smith's
notion of "the largest set." Therefore, Spencer's concep-
tion more closely agrees with the author's category of "two
or more individuals" than 4ith Smith's category "the largest
set of two or more individuals." Spencer emphasizes coopera-
tion to attain goals. Cooperation, especially in a contractual
relationship, implies the presence of rules or norms which direct
the individual's behavior to the attainment of the goals of
the contract. The two elements of goal dispositions and
norms are present in the author's category of "shared goal
dispositions." smith places them in the separate categories
of "shared goal dispositions," and "norms regarding means."
Emile Durkheim
Durkheim takes Spencer to task for this conception of
the division of labor. He asserts that a society which is
held together by this type of exchange process could not
endure for any appreciable period of time. Durkheim sums
up his position in The Division of Labor in Society when he
2d
argues that if Spencer's view is taken:
Society would be solely the stage where individuals
exchanged the products of their labor, without any
action properly social coming to regulate this ex-
change. Is this the character of societies whose
unity is produced by the division of labor? If
this were so, we could with justice doubt their
stability. For if interest relates men, it is
never for more than some few moments.13
It must be kept in mind that Durkheim criticizedSpencer's
conception in light of his own interpretation of the divi-
sion of labor.
Durkheim clearly delineates the nature of the pro-
cesses which come into play in group formation. When
individuals possess
• • • ideas, interests, sentiments, and occupations
not shared by the rest of the population, it is
inevitable that they will be attracted toward each
other under the influence of these likenesses.
They will seek each other out, enter into relations,
associate, and thus, little by little, a restricted
group, having its special characteristics, yill be
formed in the midst of the general society. 14
Durkheim calls these likenesses the collective conscience.
As he defines it, the collective conscience is "the totality
of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the
same society /777hich 7 forms a determinate system which has
its own life."15 Individuals sharing a collective conscience
associate not only because of their shared interests but also
because they derive some pleasure from forming a unity.
16
1
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Groups possess different tyl)es of solidarity dependent upon
whether the society is primitive or modern.
In primitive society the collective conscience is so
dominating that individuality tends to be lost. Primitive
societies are characterized by mechanical solidarity which
"is induced by a community of representations which gives
birth to laws imposing uniform beliefs and practices upon
0 7
individuals under the threat of repressive measures.
Individuality emerges only with the division of labor in
modern society. Durkheim readily acknowledges Comte as the
source of his notion of the division of labor.
18
However,
he disagrees with Comte's reference to authority as the
bonding force in modern society. Durkheim thinks of Comte's
position as equivocal since he relies on authority to
supplement the division of labor.
19
Durkheim's conception of social group includes
neither the notion of non-human individuals nor "the largest
set." His conception thus falls within the author's category
of "two or more individuals" and not Smith's category of
"the largest set of two or more individuals. It Durkheim
stresses the idea that relations occur between individuals.
They communicate and respond to the communications of others.
Interaction takes place. Durkheim's conception does not
17
 Robert A. Nisbet, Emile Durkheim: With Selected 
Essays (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 106.
14•1_,
ourkheim, The Division of Labor, p. 6.
19
Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work, p. 141.
cite the possibility of one-way communication within the
group. Thus, it cannot be completely included under Smith's
category, "a network of relevant communications," which
emphasizes both one-way and two-way communication. His
conception of social group is more closely related to the
author's category of "interaction" which includes only two-
way communication. Durkheim states that likenesses between
individuals have an attracting power which can lead to
group formation. It appears from his discussion that this
power of attraction is confined to simultaneously existing
individuals. Therefore, the author does not place Durkheim's
conception of social group within Smith's category of "a
shared sense of collective identity" because of Smith's
contention that a sense of collective identity can be "shared"
between living and deceased individuals. Durkheim's concep-
tion can also be placed under Smith's categories of "shared
goal dispositions" and "norms regarding means." The author
combines these two categories under his own category of
"shared goal dispositions." Although Durkheim does not view
authority as a restraining power on the division of labor,
he nevertheless recognizes that the division of labor produces
a hierarchy. He can thus be placed in Smith's categories of
"role differentiation" and "intergroup relations and group
representative roles" respectively or in the author's cate-
gory of "role differentiation" which also includes the notion
of leaders and followers. Finally, Durkheim's conception
indicates the presence of a patterning of rules and relations
within the group which falls within the author's category
of "social structure." smith has no category which corre-
sponds to this notion.
Ferdinand Toennies
Toennies bases his conception of groups on the inter-
relation of human wills. Relationships between individuals
consist "of assistance, relief, services, which are trans-
mitted back and forth from one part to another and are
considered as expressions of wills and their forces. 
,,20
These associations are thought of as units by their indivi-
dual members. They are also thought of "either as real and
organic life . . . Gemeinschaft (community); or as imaginary
and mechanical structure . Gesellschaft (society). 
"21
Natural Will arises from the individual's disposition and
character. Natural Will may range from inborn and inherited
behavior to the sharing of specific values. Rational Will,
on the other hand, arises through the evaluation of means
and ends. Rational Will may refer to any type of free
behavior or to the deliberate choice of a specific goal.
Social entities are
. . . products of human thinking and exist only for
such thinking. . . . Individuals . . . are bound
together • . . and think of their collective existence
as dominating them and as something which is repre-
sented as a person capable of volition and action,
to which they give a name.22
20
Ferdinand Toennies, Community and Society (Gemein-
schaft und Gesellschaft), trans. and ed. Charles P. Loomis






The existence of social entities may be recognized by
individuals outside of them or by other social entities.
A social relationship is the most basic and natural type
of social entity. Unlike social organization, a social
relationship is not thought of as an entity in is own right.
In the social relationship common values, which may be
physical (comi,on property, inheritance) or intellectual
(ideals), arouse in each Dart expectations of the other in
connection with mutual action.
23
When individuals realize
that they cannot fulfill their needs alone, they seek others
with whom they cooperate, e.g., a source of barter or ex-
change. Although exchange involves a common volition, it
is usually a temporary phenomenon. Permanency is achieved
partly through repetition, resulting in regularity of the
exchange act and partly through the lengthening of the
individual act by the postponement of fulfillment on the
Apart of one or both sides." Individuals do not recognize
social relationships themselves as separate entities but
they must nevertheless establish the relationship as an
existing reality. The collective is a middle form of social
entity where individuals are united into a common way of
thinking and feeling. However, volition comes into being
only in association with others and not independently. Social
organizations or corporate bodies are recognized by their
members as a kind of imaginary social person capable of
231101d*, p• 250.
24Ibid., p. 251.
independent volition and action. Social relationships may
be either Gemeinschaft-like or Gesellschaft-l'ke. In fact,
the dichotomy Which Toennies draws between Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft should be viwed "as traits, Which, in empirical
25
social entities, are found in varying proportions."
Durkheim accepts Toennies' classification in general.
However he has some reservations about the notion of Gesell-
schaft. He argues that
• • • Gesellschaft would be characterized by a
development of individualism that the state
could forestall only for a time and by artificial
procedures. It would be essentially a mechanical
aggregate; all thRt would remain of the truly
collective life would result not from internal
spontaneity, but from the impetus of the state.°
Commenting on Durkheim's criticism of his classification,
Toennies replies that it is
. . . most surprising to find in Durkheim's book
/—The Division of Labor in society 7 a diferen-
Tiation of a primiIive and derived 'solidarity,'
one of which is based on an analogous way of
thinking or on common ideas and tendencies
• • • , while the other is based in individual
differences and on the consequent division of
labor.27
He objects to Durkheim's interpretation of Gemeinschaft.
33
25R. Heberle, "The Sociological System of Ferdinand
Toennies: 'Community' and 'SocieL,y,'" in An Introduction 
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University of Chicago .ress, 1948), p. 233.
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Toennies insists that his own "conceptions do not exclude in
any wgy the fact that ruling and other active corporations or
individuals in a big nation as well as in a village or town
community take an attitude toward their entirety as organs
do toward an organism."?6
Toennies cites only human beings as part of the social
group. Although he notes that the number of individuals
affects the form of social of social groups, the author could
find neither a statement nor an implication that a group is
composed of "the largest set of two or more individuals"
(Smith's category). Toennies' conception of social groups
is thus in greater agreement with the author's category of
"two or more individuals." Because of his emphasis on
reciprocal communication, Toennies' conception cannot be
placed within Smith's category of "a network of relevant
communications" which also includes one-way communication.
His conception does fit the author's category of "interaction"
which includes only two-way communication. Toennies concep-
tion falls within Smith's categories of "shared goal dispo-
sitions" and "norms regarding means" which the author incor-
Porates into the qingle category of "shared goal dispositions."
This conception can also be placed within Smith's categories
of "role differentiation" and "intergroup relations and group
representative roles." These two categories are combined in
the author's category of "role differentiation." The elements
contained in Toennies' conception of social group imply the
Ibid., p. 1P00.
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existenece of a social structure but Toennies does not
specifically use this term. The category of "social struc-
ture" is used by the author and is not used in Smith's set
of categories.
Max '.reber
Weber also calls the most basic form of group a
social relationship. He defines it as follows:
The term 'social relationship' will be used to
designate the situation where two or more persons
are engaged in conduct wherein each takes account
of the behavior of the others in a meaningful way
and is therefore oriented in these terms. The social
relationship thus consists entirely of the probability
that individuals will behave in some meaningfully
determined way. It is completely irrelevant why such
a probability exists, but when it does there can be
found a social relationship.P9
The mutual orientation between individuals need not be
positive or affective. Moreover, the definition does not
indicate the extent to which solidarity is present in the
social relationship.30 The individuals in a social rela-
tionship are oriented to each other according to the meaning
which each attributes to the social relationship, but the
individual subjective meaning need not be the same. Weber
emphasizes that social relationships vary in duration. What
makes for a social relationshi,) "is only, the existence of the
probability that, corresponding to a given subjective meaning
complex, a certain type of behavior will take place, which
29
Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, trans. H.
q.echer (New York: The Citadel Press, 196d), p. 63.
30Ibid.
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constitutes the existence of the social relationship."
31
The
meaning attributed to the social relationship can change. It
is said to be a new relationship only if there is insufficient
continuity in the change of meaning .22 Weber states that
It is difficult to arrive at the meaning attributed to a social
relationship. The greater the rational orientation of members
within the social relationship, the greater the probability
of a correct analysis of meaning. It is also more likely if
the meaning is reached through mutual consent.
33
Weber's assertions that the social relationship is a
probability and that it relies on the behavior of individuals
are not to be misconstrued as a nominalist position on the
nature of groups. For Weber, social groups are real, at
least in the minds of the individuals participating in them:
The concepts of collective entities which are found
In common sense and in juridic and other technical
forms of thought have a meaning in the minds of indi-
vidual persons, partly as something actually existing,
partly as something with normative authority. Actors,
thus, in part orient their actions to them and in this
role such ideas have a powerful, often a decisive,
causal inIluence on the course of action of real indi-
viduals.3
Because social groups have a reality for more than one
individual, they cannot be classified with phantasms con-




34Theodore Abel, The Foundation of Sociological
Theory (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 100
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of their reality is shared. Even Weber's assertion that
social relationships exist only as an expression of a proba-
bility implies something lasting. According to Theodore Abel,
We can ask what the basis is for expecting the recur-
rence of a pattern of social actions at a given time
and plac over and over again. There are more or less
lasting commitments made, obligations undertaken, and
needs to be satisfied for which an organization of
activities has been instituted. There is, therefore,
a framework of organization in the awareness of
participants that regulates and directs their conduct.35
Following the thought of Toennies, '4eber divides social
relationships into communal and associative or aggregative.
A social relationship is communal if it is based on solidarity.
It is associative or aggregated if it is based on "a reconcil-
iation and a balancing of interests which are motivated either
by rational value-judgments or expediency.”36 Weber insists
that his distinction is more general than that of Toennies.
Weber states that a group is composed of "two or more
individuals" (the author's category) who are in meaningful
intercommunication or "interaction" (the author's category).
Weber's conception of social groups implies the presence of
"shared goal dispositions" (Smith's category) and specifically
mentions the presence of "norms" (Smith's category) which are
combined in the author's category of "shared goal dispositions.
lfeber emphasizes that Itsocioemotional patterns among group
members" (Smith's category) are not essential to social
groups. His conception can be placed in Smith's categories
35Ibid.
36
Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, p. 91.
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of "role differentiation" and "intergroup relations and group
representative roles" or in the author's category of "role
differentiation" (see Table I).
George Simmel
Simmel's approach to the study of social groups is
quite detailed. The forms of sociation or interaction within
groups are in Simmel's estimation, the subject matter of
sociology. However, sociology studies only the form and not
the content of sociation:
Neither hunger nor love, work nor religiosity, tech-
nology nor the functions and results of intelligence,
are social. They are factors in sociation only when
they transform the mere aggregation of isolated indi-
viduals into specific forms of being with and for one
annther, forms that are subsumed under the general
concept of interaction. Sociation is the form (realized
in inumerably different ways) in which individuals
grow together into a unity and within which interests
are realized.37
Pitirim A. ,Sorokin feels that Simmel's emphasis on the intri-
cate network of reciprocal human relations is a rejection of
idealism and organicism. Both the social group and society
are not merely labels but real things. Regardless of the size
of groups or how alien to the individual they seem to be, they
are just "crystallizations of this interaction, even though
they may attain autonomy and permanency and confron the indi-
vidual as if they were alien."38 The content of sociation
37Geor7- Simm=', On Individuality and Social Forms: 
Selected Writings, ed. Donald N Levine Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 24.
Pitirim A. Sorokin, "A Critique of Simmel's i,iethod,"
in Georg Simmel, ed. Lewis A. Coser (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 6.
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can vary from mutual attraction through conflict. In every
society individuals may be "with one another, for one another,
against one another."39
The clearest formultaion of Simmel's conception of
social groups is found in his analysis of the dyad and triad.
The dyad is the most basic social group. It consists of the
reciprocal relations between two individuals. Yet is possesses
"the scheme, germ, and material of innumerably more complex
forms.
140
Because the dyad has only two members, it is
characterized by impermanency. It is impermanent in the sense
that if one member drops out, it is no longer a group. Thus,
the dyad is completely dependent upon each of its members for
its continued existence. Impermanency in the dyad results in
triviality of relations. As Simmel states,
This phenomena 2.71c 7 indicates the sociological
character of the dyad: the dyad is inseparable from
the immediacy of interaction; for /in 7 neither of
its two elements is it the super-individual unit
which confronts the individual, while at the same
time it makes him participate in it.41
Because of the uniqueness which each member experiences in
his relations with the other, a sense of intimacy is also
characteristic of the dyad.
"ith the addition of a third member a change occurs
in the relations among individuals. Impermanency of relations
disappears because the absence of one member still leaves a
group consisting of two individuals. An element of indirection
40Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Geory Simmel, trans.
Kurt H. ',:olff (New York: The Free Press, 195t), D. 122.
41Ibid., p. 126.
in relations is introduced because two members of the triad
can communicate with each other by means of the third member.
This element leads to a lack of complete harmony. The triad
transcends the individuals who compose it. The third element
acts as a mediator who can either become an affective object
permitting the other two parties to communicate indirectly
or the third element can produce
. . . the concord of two colliding parties, whereby
he withdraws after making the effort of creating
direct contact between the unconnected or quarreling
elements; or he functions as an arbiter who balances,
as it were, their contradictory claims against one ,
another and eliminates what is incompatible in them.
Through his mediation the third party adds the elements of
authority, "objectivity, reason, and the means of analyzing
deviant or creative contributions from the other roles."43
What if the objective of the third party in the tirad
is not the reconciliation of conflicting parties but the
destruction of the group? Simmel does not answer this question.
Rather he views conflict as a form of socistion which aids
in group maintenance. High cohesion within groups produces
intense conflict among members. Conflict serves as
. . . a means of reestablishing unity and cohesion
of a group when it has been threatened by hostile
feelings among its members. . . . A contest fought
between group members by means of objective values
or social services is advantageous to the group and
therefore is usually fostered by it.44
42
Ibid., pp. 146-147.
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However gimmel is aware that conflict has the innate capa-
bility to destroy the group. He simply chooses to explore
the benefici,-il aspects of conflict.
Although gimmel stree s the effect of size on the
character of group relations, he does not conceive of a group
as composed of "the largest set of two or more individuals"
(gmith's category). gimmel's conception of social group can
be placed under the author's category of "two or more indi-
viduals" because of his notion that the dyad or basic group
is composed of two human individuals. Throughout his dis-
cussion of groups, Simmel emphasizes the importance of inter-
action and its various forms. His conception therefore
cannot be placed under gmith's category of "a network of
relevant communications" which includes both one-way and
two-way communication but falls in the author's category of
"interaction" which includes only two-way communication.
gimmel's conception implies the presence of "shared goal
dispositions" (gmith's category). Even in a conflictual
situation, the group members are in disagreement over the
ways of attaining the group's goals. Assuming that conflict
is resolved, the course of action agreed upon by the group
members takes on a normative character. Thus, "shared goal
dispositions" (gmith's category) and "norms" (Smith's cate-
gory) are linked and can be placed under the author's category
of "shared goal dispositions" (see Table I). gimmel's emphasis
on the range of emotions within the group (engendered by con-
flict, cooperation, etc.) excludes the use of Smith's category
L2
of "socioemotional patterns among group members."
Conclusion: Part A
The disagreement among the early European sociologists
who were investigated involves not only the elements to be
included within the conception of social group but also the
relative importance of these elements. However, all of the
early European sociologists who were studied emphasized "indi-
viduals" and "interaction" as elements of their social group
concept. It should be kept in mind that this was a relatively
youthful stage in the development of sociology. At this time
many sociologists were attempting to develop their own inde-
pendent systems of sociology.
The following paragraph is R brief restatement of the
relation of Smith's and the author's categories to the con-
ceptions of social group held by the early European sociologists
who were studied. Almost all of the early European sociolo-
gists refer to groups composed of R minimum of two people.
No mention is made of a group's being only the largest set
of individuals. The only exception is Spencer, who speaks of
tne basic unit RS the individual. Even here, however, Spencer
does not speak of the solitary individual but of the individual
in his relations with society. Although Comte and Spencer rely
heavily on the organismic conception of group, they do not
mention the nossibility of non-human individuals forming
groups. No early European sociologist studied mentions the
possibility of a group's having only one-way communication.
Rather the emphasis is on reciprocal relations, interaction,
L3
or cooperation. Within the thought of each early European
sociologist there is the implicit assumption that the group
is composed of simultaneously existing members. In his dis-
cussion of group formation, Durkheim dwells on the notion of
solidarity achieved through the recognition of likenesses.
However, he views this recognition as taking place solely
between existing individuals and as based on knowledge
rather than belief in the existence of the individuals and
of the likenesses. Comte, Spencer, and Durkheim emphasize
the division of labor as an element in social groups. However,
they also link the division of labor and the notion of auth-
ority or leadership. No mention is made of face-to-face
interaction as applicable to a general conception of social
group. Simmel confines this type of interaction primarily
to the dyad. Although the nresence of socioemotional relations





stress the non-emotive relations of contract
conceptions of the early European sociolo-
some support for the author's set of
Part B: Early American Conceptions
The purpose of part B is to describe selected early
American sociologists' conceptions of social group and to
compare them to Smith's and the
for the analysis of definitions
this section frequent reference
author's sets of categories
of social group. Throughout
should be made to Table
I which states the differences and similarities between
44
the two sets of categories.
William G. sumner
sumner Was strongly influenced by the work of Herbert
Spencer. However, he wgs a social Darwinist of a very
special kind. In his vLew, competition for survival engen-
ders cooperation and social life. In order to explain
qumner's position more clearly, the elements which went into
his conception of groups and group life will first have to
be examined.
A fundamental notion of social group is found in
Sumner's definition of society which is "a group of human
beings living in a cooperative effort to win subsistence and
45to perpetuate the species." society can consist of from
two human beings to the mass of men who constitute an advanced
society. The major factor is that they cooperate to win
existence over the forces of nature. The family is the most
elementary type of society. All higher types of society
have developed from it. The family possesses an elementary
division of labor which enables it to function far better
than any other arrangement.46
In Sumner's discussion of rudimentary groups he main-
tains that cooperation within the group calls for the suppres-
sion and reconciliation of conflicting interests. He calls
451Tilliam G. Sumner and Albert G. Keller, The Science 
of Society, Vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927),
pp. 6-7.
461411l1am G. Sumner, Social Darwinism: Selected Essays,
ed. Stow Persons (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-HalT, 1963), p. 15.
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this type of cooperation "antagonistic cooperation" which
"consists in the combination of two persons or groups to
satisfy a great common interest while minor antagonisms of
interest which exist between them are suppressed. 11147 The
underlying motive for antagonistic cooperation is survival.
However, what is the nature of the forces which lead men to
suppress their own interests and to cooperate with others?
Sumner asserts that these forces are "hunger, love, vanity,
and fear."46 They are first experienced by the individual
in the form of pain. In seeking relief, the individual
manifests random behavior. "hen n means is found for satis-
fying the need, it is repeated and communicated to others.
This continues until the form of behavior is accented within
the group. An individual habit has thus become R group
custom. It has attained R social character. Sumner calls
the end product of this process, "folkways." Folkways which
have endured for a period of time and 'ire viewed as indis-
nensible for group maintenance become mores.
Mores involve the belief on the part of the members
of the group that "their own ways are the only right ones,
and that departure from them will involve calamity.u49
since groups arrive at different sets of mores and folk-
ways, it is inevitable that they should clash and that a
°Maurice R. Davie,  illiam Graham Sumner: An Essay
of Commentary and Selections (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Co., 1963), p. 15.




distinction should be made between group members and out-
siders. Sumner calls these two types of groups in-groups and
out-groups. The in-group, or we-group, is characterized by
pence and cooperation while there is hostility and war in
its relations with out-groups. The in-groun elevates its own
folkways and mores md simultaneously devalues the folkwpys
nnd mores of the out-group. sumner calls this group attitude
"ethnocentrism." A strong ethnocentric attitude engenders
a strong sense of group solidarity.5
In short, the group is an organism which comes into
being RS a result of the struggle for survival. Division of
labor within the group emerges naturally. Cooperation is
achieved through the reconciliation of antagonistic interests.
The group develops standardized ways of dealing with its
requirements. Finally, ethnocentrism promotes solidarity
within the group and hostility toward outsiders.
Because Sumner speaks only of human groups and of
simultaneously existing group members, his conception of
social group cannot be included in Smith's categories of
"the largest set of two or more individuals," "a network of
relevant communications," and "a shared sense of collective
identity." However, his conce-Aion can be placed under the
author's categories of "two or more individuals," "inter-
action," nnd "a shared sense of collective identity" (see
Table I). Sumner discusses the norms of the group in detail.
However, norms emerge as a means of dealing with problems
50 
Ibid., p. 456.
common to the group. Norms enable the group to achieve the
basic goal of survival. Thus, Sumner links "shared goal
dispositions" (smith's category) and "norms" (smith's cate-
gory) in the same fashion as the author does in his category
of "shared goal dispositions." Sumner explicitly cites
"role differentiation" (Smith's category). However, the
notion of leaders and followers contained in Smith's category
of "intergroup relations and group representative roles" and
the author's category of "role differentiation" remains
implicit in his conception.
Lester F. lard
%:ard refers to social groups as social aggregates which
may be either partial or complete. Partial social aggregates
are not confined to a fixed geographical area and do not
embrace a whole population. Thus, individuals may be members
of two or more partial social aggregates. Complete or
universal social aggregates, on the other hand, are confined
to a fixed area and are made up of all individuals residing
in that area.
51
Social aggregates have rules which govern the behavior
of members. Because of their limited objective, partial
social aggregates have relatively mild sanctions associated
with their rules. In contrast, complete social aggregates
have only the nurnose of securing "the general good of its
members."
52
The rules of the complete social aggregate are
51
Lester F. 'Thrd, The Psychic Factors of Civilization




clearly specified and strictly enforced. 
Its organization
is analogous to consciousness in the indiv
idual organism
because consciousness functions to secure the 
well-being of
the orggnism.53
Social aggregates attempt to satisfy the dem
ands of
social forces and thus seek to "Rttain some end
, to carry
some noint, to further some scheme, to accompli
sh some pur-
pose, to gratify some ambitions, to realize some aspir
ation."54
Yard subdivides social forces into physical forces a
nd spir-
itual or psychic forces. Physical forces are further 
sub-
divided into preservative forces which involve pleasure
seeking and reproductive forces which invol‘e "sexual des
ire"
and affection for parents or kin."55 The psychic forces 
are
classified as emotional, esthetic or intellectual.
56 Yard
Ibid., p. 298.
54Israel Gerver, Lester Frank Yard: Selections from
His 1Jorks (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1963), p. 9.
55Samuel Chugerman, Lester F. 'Ward: The American 
;1-6o4_.s 
citotle (Durham: Duke Univeriity Press, nn), 
DD. 1u3-
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Albion Y. Small also recognized the existence of
social forces but he utilized this conception in 
order to
develop his classification of interests. In his view, soc
ial
forces do not correspond to man's universal inclinations as
in Yard's conception but are specific desires which are
manifested in the activities of individuals. The sim
plest
activities are the interests which Small defines as 
"an
unsatisfied capacity corresponding to an unrealized 
condition"
(Don Martindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological 
Theory 
/7oston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1-960/, D. 193). Small finofs— -
six classes of interests which first cause conflict 
within
the group and later become resolved into cooperation t
hrough
the process of socialization. Cooperation based on congru
ence
of interests leads to group formation. Small conceives 
of
group as "any number of individuals between whom rel
ations
are discovered such that they must be thought of 
together"
L.9
states that social forces combine into a new force of ex-
tremely great potential, "the social mind," which he also
calls "public opinion" or "the social will." The social mind
functions in a manner similar to that of the individual will:
Just as the individual will controls the emotions
of the individual, so the social will governs the
collective emotions of society. . . . Only the
social will can control the social forces.57
Although Ward divides social groups into partial and
complete social aggregates, his conception does not make use
of the notion of "the largest set of two or more individuals"
(Smith's category). Instead, Ward conceives of a multitude
of partial social aggregates existing within a complete
social aggregate so that his conception can be placed under
the author's category of "two or more individuals." Yard
states that cooperation and intercommunication among indi-
viduals within social
the demands of social
way communication" is
aggregates are necessary to satisfy
forces. Thus, Smith's notion of "one-
absent from Ward's conception of social
groups. His conception is in greater agreement with the
author's category of "interaction" which contains only the
notion of "two-way communication." Ward links "norms"
(Smith's category) and "shared goal dispositions" (Smith's
category) which are both combined in the author's category
(ibid., p. 194). Both social life and social process are de-
pendent on group interests and the life cycle of groups. Also
see Edward C. Hayes, "Albion Woodbury Small," in American 
Masters of Social Science, ed. Howard W. Odum (Port Washing-
ton: Kennikat Press, )96), pp. 149-187.
57Chugerman, The 4merican Aristotle, p. 166.
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of "shared goal dispositions" (see Table I). Ward's notion
of psychic forces does not fall under Smith's category of
socioemotional patterns among group members" because of
his emphasis on non-emotive intellectual forces.
Franklin H. Giddings
Giddings' conception of social group centers around
the interplay of three elements: "consciousness of kind,'
"the social mind," and "volition" which he describes in his
analysis of group formation. The stimulus to group formation
is, at first, physical and external to the individual and
includes such things as climate, food, or conflict with others.
The resulting aggregations are normally composed of similar
parts:
But presently, within the aggregation, a consciousness
of kind appears in like individuals and develops into
association. Association, in its turn, begins to react
favourably on the pleasures and on the life chances of
individuals. . . . Thenceforward, the associated indi-
viduals deliberately seek to extend and to perfect
their social relations.58
Volition also plays an important role in group for-
mation. Imitation is closely interwoven in the volitional
process and together with the physical environment imposes
limitations on the social process. According to Giddings,
Volition acts upon the social process through impulse
and imitation, and consciously, through rational choice.
The laws of the volitional process therefore are laws
of imitation and of social choice. The laws of limi-
tation by the physical process are laws of selection
and survival.59
58Franklin H. Giddings, The ?rinci)les of Sociology
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 9.
"Ibid., p. 40u.
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Although Giddings relies on Tarde's conception of imitation,
he adds the elements of impulse and like-reaction. Giddings
argues that the social mind acts as a mechanism for the main-
tenance of group cohesion. The social mind is a real thing
but still can be found in individual minds. It is "the simul-
taneous like-mental-activity of two or more individuals in
communication with one another, or as a concert of the emotion,
thought, and will of two or more communicating individuals. 
"60
The most fundamental comi onent of the social mind is
consciousness of kind. Giddings acknowledges that this con-
cept is complex but argues that it is the simplest state of
the social mind. In fact, "all other states of the human mind
which can be called social and which enter into social activ-
ities are found upon examination to be composed of the con-
sciousness of kind in combination with various other ideas,
desires, and passions. 
"61
The consciousness of kind is made
up of four elements: the desire for recognition, the ,er-
ception of resemblance, reflective sympathy, and organic
sympathy. Of these four elements, organic sympathy is the
most important and consists of the elements of like sensations,
like resronsiveness and "the readier imitation of one another
by like individuals than by those who greatly differ. 
"62
Giddings states that cooperation is an essential element
66  Franklin H. Giddings, The Elements of Sociolo : A 
Text-Book for Colleges and Schools (New York: The Macmillan






within groups, but there can be no cooperation without the
presence of consciousness of kind. Traditional cooperative
activities are folkways. Giddings also builds on Sumner's
classification of folkways, mores, and laws by introducing
the notion of "themistes" which are a type of mores. They
involve "concerted volition and am:1y social pressure through
boycotting, outlawry, and other social dooms, including
death. 63 Giddings further asserts that in times of crisis
traditional behavior is overcome and is partially replaced
by rational deliberation.
Giddings defines groups or associations as a number
of individuals who interact because of consciousness of kind.
In his words, groups involve "the commingling and the plur-
alistic activities of individuals who are conscious of them-
selves and of their behavior, and whose consciousness is
conversationalized. Giddings distinguished groups from
society by the presence of common goals. In his conception
the family is an intermediate group between associating and
society. Society is composed of families maintaining more
“65or less "permanent association generation after generation.
Giddings conception of social groups uses Spencer's
notion of the social organism as a starting point. However,
6-r
3_
ranklin H. Giddings, Studies in the Theory of 
Human Society (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), p. 264.
64Ibid., p. 262.
65Franklin H. Giddings, Civilization and Society: 
An Account of the Development and Behavior of Human Society 
(New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1932), p. 37.
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he differs from Spencer in his emphasis on consciousness of
kind. Groups form through the struggle between the individual
and the forces of nature and are held together by conscious-
ness of kind.
The central element in Giddings' conception of social
group, "consciousness of kind," is specifically included in
the author's category of "a shared sense of collective iden-
tity" and not in Smith's category of the same name. Because
consciousness of kind refers solely to contemporaneous indi-
viduals, Giddings' conception does not completely fit either
Smith's category of "the largest set of two or more individuals"
or his category of "a network of relevant communications" (see
Table I). However, it does fit the author's categories of
"two or more individuals" and "interaction." Like Ward,
Giddings cites "norms" (Smith's category) and "Shared goal
dis,ositions" (Smith's category). These two notions can also
be placed under the author's category of "shared goal dispo-
sitions."
Edward Alsworth Ross
Ross' conception of social groups excludes the organic
analogy. He asserts that in spite of the insistence of earlier
sociologists on the existence of the social organism, it is
nowhere to be found.66 Instead, Ross uses Simmel's "forms
of sociation" and Small's "social processes as the starting
point for his conception of social groups. He views social
66
Edward A. Ross, Foundations of Sociology (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1919), ,,. 3.
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processes as types of repeated patterns of social phenomena
and subdivides them into four basic types: association,
domination, exploitation, and opposition.
These social processes together with other factors
form an end product, the social group. In Principles of
Sociology Ross succinctly describes the way in which each of
the social processes contributes to the formation of social
groups:
Domination calls into being large aggregates, such
as realms and empires. Exploitation binds exploiters
and exploited together in certain permanent relations.
Opposition between sects, races, parties, sections,
classes, and nations causes those on the same side to
stand together both from sympathy and in order to win.
When two elements of a population engage in struggle,
up to a certain point the blows of each pound the
other into coherence. Conflict has long been recog-
nized as the arch-consolidator. Adaptation smooths away
the obstacles to the formation of groups or makes men
more harmonious if they are already in the same group.
Stratification extends the we-feeling among those of
the same social condition. Socialization makes people
ready to cohere when an occasion for union presents
itself. Professionalization necessitates a union of
those within the same profession to formulate its
standards and to expose, punish, or castout practi-
tioners who ignore these standards.67
Ross states that "common traits" which distinguish indivi-
duals within the social group from outsiders must be present
and that there must also be a "momentous common interest"
which overrides the specific interests of the members and
which can only be realized within the group.
68
The social process works in two ways to further the
67
 Edward A. Ross, Principles of Sociology (New York:




solidarity of the group. Opposition increases the group's
internal solidarity as well as the number of characteristics
which make it a distinct entity. Also, a socializing process
tends to increase the areas of concurrence between the members
of the group and outsiders. This process acts to "level the
carriers it /the group _7 has raised against rivals."69
In contrast to the early European sociologists who were
studied, Ross contends that while groups are real, society is
not. It is merely the name for "people in their collective
ca.asity.,70 Ross does not view the division of labor as
essential to group life but links this element with the organic
conception of groups. Ross agrees with Simmel's "forms of
sociation" but believes that this notion belongs more to social
morphology than sociology. Ross rejects Tarde's conception
of imitation as a social factor but nevertheless finds it at
work in the formation of mobs. Finally, he asserts that
%Yard's classification of social forces is "by far the most
helpful that has been made.
,71
Ross' enumeration of the social processes which produce
social groups can be placed under the author's categories of
"two or more individuals," "interaction," "a shared sense of
collective identity," "shared goal dispositions," and
structure. Like the preceding sociologists, Ross does not
69
Ross, Foundations of Sociology, p. P85.
7L Edward A. Ross, Social Control: A Survey of the 
Foundations of Order (New York: The Macmillan Co., 11729),
p. 41 b-
71
Ross, Foundations of Sociology, p. 167.
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include the notions of "the largest set," "one-way communi-
cation, ' or group members who are widely separated in space-
time within his conception of social group. This precludes
the , lacement of Ross'conception under Smith's categories of
"the largest set of two or more individuals," "a network of
relevant communications," or "a shared sense of collective
identity." respectively. All of these categories are broader
than the elements found in Ross' conception. Ross' conception
of social groups can be placed in Smith's categories of
"shared goal dis,-)ositions" and "norms." Finally, Smith has
no category corresponding to the author's category of "social
structure.
Charles H. Cooley
Cooley applies the organic analogy to social groups
but argues that he uses it "in no abstruse sense but merely
to mean a vital unity in human 
life."72 
The starting point
for understanding Cooley's conception of social groups is
his analysis of the nature of primary groups which he views
as the source of both human nature and of more complex and
fragmented secondary groups.
Cooley states that primary groups are characterized by:
1. Face-to-face association.
2. The unspecialized character of that association.
3. Relative permanence.
4. The small number of persons involved.
5. The relative intimacy among the participants.73
72
Charles H. Cooley, Social Organization: A Study of
the Larger Mind (New York: Schocken Books, 19b13), 9.
73Charles H. Cooley, Robert C. Angell, and Lowell J.
Carr, Introductory Sociology (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1933), p. 5 •
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Despite its intimacy, the primary group does not manifest
complete harmony. In addition, self-assertion and competition
are also present within the primary group and are controlled
by its unity. The unity of the primary group is expressed
in the term "we." This "we-feeling" involves both sympathy
and mutual identification. 1hIle the we-feeling manifests
group unity, it is also inseparable from the individual's
self-image or "I." Cooley argues that the "group self or
'we' is simply an '1' which includes other persons.“74 The
"I” is a social self, the idea of which has been provided
In relations with others. The individual reacts to his
imagination of another's judgment of himself and adjusts
his behavL accordingly. This process of continual adjust-
ment is found in the notion of "the looking-glass self."75
Through association in the primary group, the individual
develops both his self-image and his human nature.
The process of communication underlies the character
of the primary group. Communication includes not only spoken
and written words but also non-verbal communication and commu-
nication through mechanical instruments. Communication is
of such importance that without it "the mind does not develop
a true human nature but remains in an abnormal and nondescript
state neither human nor properly brutal."76
714-Charles H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order
(New York: Schocken Books, 1967), p. 209.
Cooley, Angell, and Carr, Introductory Sociology,
p. 121.
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Cooley, Social Organization, p. 62.
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The primary group may take the forms of family, play-
group or neighborhood. Cooley maintains that the simplest
type of primary group is "the intimate pair-group" which
consists of only two individuals.
77 Primary groups are
the source of secondary groups which are later and more
complex forms. Secondary groups do not require face-to-
face interaction and are, according to Cooley, Angell, and
Carr,
Association narrowed down by special purpose, by
communication at a distance, by rules, by social
barriers, or by the casual nature of contact. This
means that under such conditions associating person-
alities present only special facets of themselves
to one another. They cannot meet as whole persons.7°
Cooley accepts Sumner's notion of folkways and mores
and places it under the general heading of patterns of
adjustment. Cooley's conception of solidarity relies on
the work of Durkheim. This is evident in his discussion
of solidarity in The Social Process:
Formerly we lived in many small societies the relations
among which were comparatively external and mechanical;
now we live in one great society the parts of which are
vitally and consciously united. The instances of this
are familiar--the world-wide traffic, travel, and inter-
change of thought; the universal fashions, the interna-
tional markets, the cooperation in science and in
humanitarian movements. This is that modern solidarity,
S3 wonderfully increased within the memory of living
men, which makes the understanding of our life a new
problem. 79
P. 210.
77Cooley, Angell, and Carr, Introductory Sociology,
78
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5 9
Cooley end /-roall find the source of the increase of groups
in the pursuit of interest.
By comparing Cooley's conception of primary groups
with the conception of secondary groups developed by Cooley,
Angell, and Carr the elements which are common to all social
groups become apparent. Difference in group size affects
the nature of relations within groups; both primary and
secondary groups contain only human individuals. His con-
.zeption thus fits only the author's category of "two or more
individuals." Primary and secondary groups manifest differ-
ent patterns and contents of intercommunication between
simultaneously existing individuals and also possess differ-
ent types of solidarity. Therefore, Cooley's concept can
be placed in the author's categories of "interaction" and
"a shared sense of collective identity" but not in Smith's
categories of "a network of relevant communications" or
"a shared sense of collective identity" (see Table I).
Because Cooley accepts Small's notion of interests as well
as Sumner's notion of folkways and mores, his conception
can be placed under Smith's categories of "shared goal
dispositions" and "norms" or the author's category of
"shared goal dispositions." Finally, Cooley views "face-
to-face interaction" (Smith's category) as essential only
to primary groups.
George H. Mead
In order to understand Mead's conception of social
group, attention must first be given to those elements which
6o
comprise his general system of thought. Mead never clearly
defines what he means by social group, and so his con
ception
must be approached circuitously. The starting point for
 this
discussion in Mead's conception of the social act. An 
act
considered in itself is the choice of certain stimuli 
which
enable an organism to maintain its life-process. For 
an act
to be social it must "involve the co-operation of more t
han
one individual, and . . . its object as defined by 
the act,
80
in the sense of Bergson, is a social object." 
otjec'
in order to be social must be responsive to all individuals
in the actp and its objective must be a group and not an indi-
vidual objective.
The individuals involved in a social act are able to
cooperate by means of communication. Mead and Cooley 
consid-
ered communication to be the basis of the social self and of
all social activities. Through communication the individual
is able to see himself Rs an object. This is possible because
communication includes not just interaction with others but
interaction with one's self. In Mead's words, 'The elabor-
ation, then, of the intelligence of the vertebrate form in
human society is dependent upon the development of this sor
t
of social reaction in which the individual can influence hi
m-
self as he influences others."
81
Mead breaks communication down into gesture and lan-
tio
George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. Charles
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guage. He identifies gesture with the start of the social
act. It serves as a stimulus to which other forms respond.
These responses in turn serve as stimuli to the form which
initiated thP lct. Gestures are exhibited by both non-human
and human forms. However, only human forms have a self-con-
sciousness of the inner attitudes which the gesture manifests.
rhus, human gesture has a double meaning; the meaning inter-
preted by the responding organism and the meaning which
resides in the gesturing organism. When this meaning is
located within the social act and is the same for the ges-
turing and responding organism, it becomes a significant
symbol. According to Mead,
In this way every gesture comes within a given social
group or community to stand for a particular act or
response, namely, the act or response which it calls
forth explicitly in the individual to whom it is
addressed, and implicitly in the individual who makes
it; and this particular act or response for which it
stands is its meaning as a significant symbol.62
Language is composed of a set of significant symbols which
serve to elicit the appropriate responses from other members
involved in a social process.
Another important element which is closely connected
with language and the emergence of the social self is "the
generalized other." It amounts to the internalization within
the individual of a complex of common group attitudes. In
fact, the group or community which provides these attitudes
Is "the generalized other." Mead states that in order for





• • • in the same way that he takes the attitudes of
other individuals toward himself and toward one another,
take their attitudes toward the various phases or aspects
of common social activity or set of social undertakings
in which, as members of an organized society or social
group, they are all engaged; and he must then, by gen-
eralizing these individual attitudes of that organized
society or social group itself, as a whole, act toward
different social projects which at any given time it
is carrying out, or toward the various larger phases
of the general social process which constitutes its
life and of which these projects are specific manifes-
tations.83
It is through the internalization of "the generalized other"
that the individual can respond not lust to other individuals
but to the social group as a whole. The individual's self,
then, develops in two stages. In the first stage the indi-
vidual responds solely to other individuals involved in a
social act, his significant others. In the second stage he
responds to the social group as a whole by means of the
generalized other.
Two aspects of self spring from this notion of "the
generalized other," the "I" and the "me." Mead's notion of
the "ma" bears a strong similarity to Cooley's notion of the
"I." For Cooley, the "I" is a social selr whose definition
has been provided by the individual's social environment.
For Mead, the "I" is "a sustained identity which is socially
underived."84 As Cooley's "I," Mead's "me" is derived from
the social environment. Unlike Cooley's "I," the "me" is
831b1d., pp. 154-155.
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not specifically related to Ft "looking-glass self." Rather
it represents the attitudes of the social group which have
been internalized by the individual. Mead relates the "I"
to the "me" as follows:
The 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes
of others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes
of others which one assumes. The attitudes of the others
constitute the organized 'me,' end then one reacts toward
that as an
I.;hile there is no specific mention of a "looking-glass self"
in Mead, his description of the process of attitude internal-
ization in the "Me' is similar to that described by Cooley
in his notion of the "looking-glass self."
The self is most easily integrated into functional
groups in which the individual relates solely to other members
of the same group. In this instance, the relation tends to
realize "the ideal of any social situation respecting organ-
ization, unification, co-operation, and the integration of
the behavior of the several individuals involved. 
.86
When
individuals are members of different functional groups inte-
gration is difficult because they lack common interests and
goals on which to base their relationship.
Mead viewed the family as the basic social group.
However, the family is not responsible for the more complex
forms of human association. Instead the self arises through
family relations nnd serves as the stimulus for further




Mead's conception of social groups underscores the
importance of communication between human beings so that his
conception fits the author's categories of "two or more
individuals" and "interaction but not Smith's categories of
"the largest set of two or more individuals" or "a network
of relevant communications" (see Table I). Mead's defin-
ition of the social object as well as his reference to
the importance of common interests and goals in functional
groups allows his conception to be placed in Smith's cate-
gory of "shared goal dispositions." Finally, Mead's dis-
cussion of functional groups cites the element of organization
which falls under the author's category of "social structure."
Pitirim A. orokin
'orokin's conception of social group is concisely
presented in Soniety, Culture, and Personality.
68
His con-
ception relies on the understanding of two elements: "inter-
action" and the "causal-meaningful unity" of the group.
Interaction involves the interplay of three elements: "indi-
viduals," "meanings-norms-values," and "vehicles." The
subject of interaction is the human individual capable of
thought, action, and reaction. Individuals interact because
of meqnings-norms-values which they possess and exchange.




Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture, and Person-
ality: Their Structure and Dynamics (New York: Cooper Square
Publishers, Inc., 1962), pp. 145-156.
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involves:
(1) cognitive meanings, in the narrow sense of the
term, such as the meaning of Plato's philosophy
. . . ; (2) meaningful values, such as the economic
value of land . . . ; (3) norms referred toas a
standard, like the norms of lawand ethics.0
gorokin states that meaning, values, and norms can all be
interchanged since they form a general class of meaningful
phenomena. Meaning is of such importance that its absence
reduces interaction to the realm of the biophysical sciences.
The final element of interaction is the vehicle which is
overt action and material objects. The set of meanings
become objectified in the vehicles which transmit them from
one individual to another. Meanings-norms-values can be
objectified in different vehicles.
90
In gorokin's system, the group is first a causal-
functional unity in the sense that there is R triple inter-
dependence of parts with parts, parts with the whole, and
the whole with the parts. This triple interdependence forms
the group into a cohesive unity in an o-ganic and not a
mechanical or spatial sense. The group is a meaningful unity
because it involves interaction in terms of meaning. Sorokin
argues that meanings tend to become integrated into a logically
consistent whole.
91
The group is real since it neither consists solely of










it encounters disruptive external forces. Instead, the group
always seeks to restore or maintain its unity. The reality
of the group is found in the meaningful interaction of its
members. It is not, as argued by Durkheim, external to the
individual.
92
Inasmuch as each group possesses its own set
of meanings-values-norms, it possesses its own individuality.
Vehicles play a relatively minor part in determining the
Individual character of the group since the same vehicles
can be used to objectify different meanings.93 Also, as
long as the meanings-norms-values remain the same, the
group can change its members and/or vehicles without losing
or changing its individuality.
Group change is inner directed. According to Sorokin,
the group is "a self-changing and self-directing unity that
bears in itself the essentials of its life-career, the di-
rection of its change, its phases, and its destination. "94
However, external forces may facilitate or inhibit change
within the group or may even destroy it. Also, groups are
both quantitatively selective in terms of the number of
members which they incorporate and qualitatively selective
in terms of their membership qualifications and their mean-
ings-norms-values. Finally, as a result of their unity and
self-direction, groups can undergo only limited variation.





values-norms, it would lose its identity.
Sorokin's emphasis on meaning and on the vehicles
which objectify meaning brings his conception of social group
close to that of Mead. Sorokin also recognizes the impor-
tance of gestures as stimuli which evoke similar mental
states in individuals.95 In contrast to Mead, Sorokin em-
phasizes the importance of the biological as well as the
social self. As he states, "The initial constellation of
the child's selfs consists of his biological selfs surrounded
by his sociocultural selfs or egos.”96 The change ia or
development of the social selfs is dependent upon unalterable
development of the biological selfs and changes in the indi-
vidual's position in his social groups.
Sorokin's conception of social group emphasizes the
element of "norms" (Smith's category) which he links with
"shared goal dispositions" (Smith's category). Sorokin
terms the process of exchange of meanings-norms-values be-
tween uman individuals "interaction" (the author's category).
He does not view the group as "the largest set of two or
more individuals" (Smith's category) but as "two or more
individuals" (the author's category).
Conclusion: Part B
The early American sociologistsana the early European





or more indtviduals" (the author's category) and "inter-
action" (the author's category) within the social group.
Fecause of Smith's emphsis on the possibility of non-human
individuals and one-way communication within groups, none of
the conceptions of the early American sociologists who were
studied can be placed under his categories of "the largest
set of two or more individuals" or "a network of relevant
communications." Giddings, Ross, and Cooley include the
notion of "a shared sense of collective identity (the author's
category) but mention only contemporaneous individuals. For
this reason, the conceptions of social group of Giddings,
Ross, and Cooley cannot be placed under Smith's category
of "a shared sense of collective identity" (see Table I).
With the exception of Mead, all of the early American soci-
ologists who emphasize "shared goal dispositions (Smith's
category) also emphasize "norms" (Smith's category). The
author combines both of these categories to form his own
category of "shared goal dispositions." Ross and Mead em-
phasize the presence of a "social structure"(the author's
category) for which Smith has no corresponding category.
Again, more support has been found for the author's
set of categories than for Smith's. Although the early
American conceptions of social group manifest greater con-
sistency than the conceptions of the early Europeen sociolo-
gists who were studied, they do not move in the direction of
the notions contained in Smith's set of categories. In the
next chapter both sets of categories will be applied to a
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sample of definitions of social group in order to determine
which set has the greater utility.
CHAPTER IV
DEFINITION" OF "OCIAL GROUP IN
INTRODUCTORY "OCIOLOGY TEXT":
1964 TO 1973
The purpose of this chapter is to apply "mith's and
the author's sets of categories for the analysis of defini-
tions of social group to a sample of definitions from intro-
ductory sociology texts between 1964 and 1973. Introductory
texts are used since one of their purposes is the definition
of the principal concepts in the discipline. Also, texts
with more than one edition are used since these reflect the
widest use.
The sample consists of "c-P introductory sociology texts
Published in the United "tates.
1
Special purpose introauc-
tory sociology texts aimed at a particular occupation, such
as nursing, and edited books were omitted. The author feels
that this manner of sample selection is both representative
and systematic.
In order to make a more effective comparison of Smith's
set of categories with those of the author, this chapter is
divided into three parts. Part A analyzes the definitions
'The sample is drawn from the texts listed in the
"ub ect :Wide to Books in Print 1973: An Index to the Pub.-
ushers Trade List Annual, Vol. 3 (New York: R. R. Bowker
Co., 1973), pp. 3524-3535. For alisting of the texts included
in the sample see the "Bibliography of the "ample," p. 111.
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of social group in order to determine the elements which
each text includes in the definition. Although the defini-
tion of social group in each introductory sociology text is
presented, only those elements of the definition which the
author feels have a special bearing on Smith's and the au-
thor's sets of categories are analyzed. A complete break-
down of the elements in each definition is made in Tables
II, III, IV, and V. In addition, an investigation is made
of the entities to which social group is contrasted, e.g.,
categories and aggregates. The introductory texts are
presented in order of publication and alphabetically by
author within the same year. In part B an application of
Smith's set of categories to the definitions of social
group is made. Any deficiencies and/or inconsistencies in
Smith's set of categories are noted here. Also, a compari-
son of Smith's set of categories with the author's is made
to see if the same deficiencies are present. In part C
the author's set of categories is applied to the definitions
of social group. In this part the extent of agreement among
the various texts on the definition of social group is pre-
sented.
Part A: Definitions of Social Group
In Introductory Texts
Ogburn and Nimkoff
Ogburn and Nimkoff contrast social groups to statis-
tical and social categories. These two types of categories
differ only in that the similarities between individuals are
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assigned in the former and socially derived in the latter.
No contrast is made with aggregates. The text states that
a social group is "characterized by patterned interaction,
shsred beliefs and values, and 'consciousness of kind'."'
Although no minimum number of individuals is stated in the
definition, the text does cite the dyad as the smallest type
of social group.
Bell and Sirjamaki
The definition employed in this text is derived from
its general system of classification which consists of the
elements of intensity, duration, and frequency. Within
the text it is argued that a definition including just the
elements of individuals and interaction is of little utility.
cluch a definition includes chance encounters which are un-
repeated and of short duration. They therefore use the
term group "to designate those collections of people whose
members have patterned interaction, roles, have R sense
of belonging, and cherish some sense of purpose."3 In
the chapter entitled "Groups and Social Systems - The
Basis of Orderly Behavior," six elements are cited as
essential for social groups and social systems. These are:
and purpose.4positions, roles, relationships, status, norms,
2William F.




Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, Sociology,
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 120.
11 and John $Urjarriaki, Social Foundations
2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
4Ibid., p. 196.
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With the exception of "norms," these elements are identical
with the elements cited in the definition. In the section
following the definition, social groups are distinguished
not only from aggregates and social categories but also from
audiences, publics, or mobs.
Chinoy
Along much the same lines as the previous definitions,
Is the definition in this text. As it states,
A social group consists of a number of persons whose
relationships are based upon a set of interrelated
roles and statuses. They interact with one another
in a more or less standardized fashion determined
largely by the norms and values they accept. They
are united or held together by a sense of common
identity or similarity of interests which enables
them to differentiate members from nonmembers. The
social group is identified by three attributes:
patterned interaction, shared or similar beliefs and
values, and to use Franklin H. Giddings' phrase,
consciousness of kind.
In the same section as that in which the definition is
found, social groups are differentiated from categories
and aggregates.
Cuber
A social group is "any number of human beings in
reciprocal communication."6 The first part of this defini-
tion could not be included under Smith's original category
of "the largest set of two or more individuals" since
specific reference is made only to human beings. While
5Ely Chinoy, Society: An Introduction to Sociology,
2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 41.
6
John F. Cuber, Sociology: A Synopsis of Princi les,
6th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 196b), p. 73.
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Cuber does not specify a minimum number in the definition,
he does so in his explanation. As he states, "A group may
be of any size from two persons to, theoretically and poten-
tially, the entire population of the world."7 Cuber does
not explain how it is potentially possible for the entire
world population to form a social group. In fact, when he
distinguishes social groups from aggregates he places the
world population under this definition:
An aggregation is a collectivity of persoas who are
held together in a physical sense by some factor
other than intercommunication. The population A of
a country or of the world are cases in point.°
He also distinguishes social groups from categories. Cuber
asserts that communication is the most important aspect of
group formation but he does not explain why this is so. He
also argues that communication must be two-way.
Lundberg, Schrag, Larsen, and Catton
Social group is defined in two places in this text.
The first definition, which is found in the section of the
text devoted to basic concepts, states that a group is "two
or more persons who take each other into account in their
actions and thus are held together and set apart from others.n9
The only difference between the first and the second definition
which is found in the section distinguishing social groups




9George A. Lundberg et al., Sociology, 4th ed. (New
York: Harper & Row, 196b), p
75
"by virtue of their interaction " to the second definition.
%
In the discussion following the second definition interaction
Is asserted to be the distinctively sociological basis for
,the identification of social groups.
11
Merrill
Merrill presents two slightly different definitions
of social group. In the first version a group is two or
more persons who interact over an apnreciable period and
share a common purpose.
u12 
The previous edition of this
text used the same definition but cited Ralph M. Stodgill
3as the source.
1
 Merrill's own definition contains some
additional elements:
The group is a unit composed of two or more people
who are: (a) in interaction over a more or less con-
tinuous period; (b) mutually aware of each other as
members; (c) able to communicate effectively: and
(d) established in a definite structure or pattern. 4
He does not identify the exact amount of time required for
interaction to lead to group formation. However, Merrill
does discuss what he means by effective communication. Using





LFrancis E. Merrill, Society and Culture: An Intro-
duction to Sociology, 4th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1969), p. fl.
13
Idem, Society and Culture: An Introduction to
Sociology, 4th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965),
D. 43. The definition used by Merrill is taken from Ralph
M. Stodgill, Individual Behavior and Group Achievement (New
York: Oxford liniversity Press, 1959), p. 17.
14Idem, Society and Culture, 4th ed., p. 13.
is effective when an exchange of meaningful gestures Petween
individuals has taken place.
15
Aggregates and categories are




This definition and the one by Vander Zanden which will
follow are extremely similar. In fact, Vander Zanaen acknow-
ledges that his definition is taken from Bierstedt. Bier-
stedt's definition stands out since the term, group, is
applied to what is usually defined as either a statistical
or social category. Bierstedt illustrates four types of
























For the purposes of the present discussion, the analysis is
confined to the definition of social group alone. Using
Bierstedt's illustration, one would expect to find only the
elements of people, consciousness of kind, and social inter-
action. While this does occur, there is also the inclusion
15Ibid., p. 14.
1 
6Arnold M. Rose and Caroline B. Rose, Sociology: The 
Study of Human Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1969 D. 589.
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of crowds. In Bierstedt's words,
We use the word 'social' here in its narrowest sense,
that is, to imply social contact and communication,
social interaction and social intercourse. . . . In
any event social groups are those in which people
actually associate with one another. They can be of
many kinds - friendship or acquaintance groups,
classroom groups, cliques, crowds, audiences, con-
gregations, kinship groups, passengers on the same
ship, neighborhood groups, play groups, and numerous
others. In these groups there is not only conscious-
ness of kind or of some like interest but also social
interaction--extending from polite conversation, or
simply mutual awareness, at one polg to the most
intimate relationship at the other.17
Neither category nor aggregate is defined elsewhere in the
text.
Rose and Rose
Rose and Rose do not devote any specific section of
their text to the definition of social group. Their defin-
ition is found in an appendix of sociological terms. For
them, a group is "a number of people having some meanings
and/or values in common, which other persons do not share,
and who therefore have a special set of perceived expecta-
tions in relation to one another as a result of previous
interactions." 
16
Although they do not indicate a minimum
number of two individuals in their definition, they do cite
it elsewhere in the text.
19
They make no distinction among




Arnold M. Rose and Caroline B. Rose, Sociology:
The Study of Human Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfre





Vander Zanden's discussion of social groups is similar
to Bierstedt's except in his illustration. He substitutes
the terms statistical and social categories for 3ierstedt's
statistical and societal groups and also association for
associational group.
20
He confines the term, group, only
to social group which he defines with the same elements as
those found in Bierstedt's definition. According to Vander
Zanden,
Social groups are similar to social categories in
that their members are aware that they share something
in common--a consciousness of kind. They differ from
social categories in one important respect--social
relations between individuals. The members of a social
group are in interaction with one another--that is,
there is a mutue1 and reciprocal influencing by two
or more peoplg of each other's feelings, attitudes,
and actions.21
Vander Zanden as Bierstedt does not contrast social groups
with aggregates.
Fichter
According to Fichter, "A group is an identifiable,
structured, continuing collectivity of social persons who
enact reciprocal roles according to social norms, interests,
and values in the pursuit of comion goals. The element
of "external perception of group membership" is mentioned.
2u
James W. Vander Zanden, Sociology: A Systematic





Joseph H. Fichter, Sociology, 2nd ed. (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 108.
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This element includes even secret societies which "have a
recognizable existence, although their membership may be
exclusive and hidden. 
"23
Fichter asserts that superordi-
nation and subordination are always present in social groups
no matter how small, informal, or equalitarian. He argues
that "there is ,always .5Mphasis mine _7 at least a trace of
subordination or superordination even in the most equali-
tarian v groups. Al However he does not explain it. In this
definition groups cannot be in any way transitory. In fact,
one of the principal characteristics distinguishing social
groups from aggregates is the brief duration of aggregates.
There must also be activity, but the activity must be di-
rected toward the realization of a goal or goals.
25
 The
above factors also imply a social structure. Social groups,
aggregates, and categories are viewed as separate entities.
McNall
The definitions of McNall and Cuber are the shortest
of all those considered in the sample. McNall's definition
is not even one sentence long and occurs within a discussion
of associational behavior. According to McNall, "Associations
differ in complexity from the most simple group, two or more
people in interaction with one another, to large-scale bureau-
cracies with written constitutions.






Scott G. McNall, The Socioloeical Experience, 2nd
ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p.
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social group contains only two elements, people and inter-
action. He does not discuss the definition but instead
goes into a discussion of primary and secondary groups.
There is no mention of either categories or aggregates.
Toby
In this text there is no discussion of groups; the
definition appears in the glossary and is referred to only
once in the first chapter. Social category is defined within
the definition of group. A social group is
. . . a plurality of interacting individuals with
some sense of solidarity. (Members of a social cate-
gory, e. g., the physically handicapped, are a group
only in a classificatory and not an interactive
sense. )27
Aggregate in not defined either in the glossary or in the
body of the text.
Wilson indirectly includes people in his definition of
social group. As he states,
The common conception of a group is misleading. It
is not a collection of people. But if a group does 26
not consist in people it nonetheless requires them.
It seems contradictory to state that people are net necessary
to the definition of a group but are necessary for the group
itself if it is to be social or human. Wilson defines a
social group in the following manner: "A group consists of
27Jackson Toby, Contemporary Society: An Introduction
to Sociology, ?rid ed. (New York: John ',41.1ey & Sons, Inc.,
1971 ), P. 599-
,6_
t;verett K. Wilson, Sociology: Rules, Roles, and 
ReL:tionships, rev. ed. (Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1971 ),
p. 30.
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one or more relationships whose boundaries are marked by the
interlocking of differentiated roles and a common mission. 
29
Wilson does not include his definition and discussion of social
groups in the chapter on groups but in a footnote in the chap-
ter on socialization. Finally, Wilson includes people in
his definitions of categories and aggregates. These defini-
tions are found immediately after his definition of social
group.
Green
In Green's view a social group is
. . . an aggregate of individuals which persists in
time, which has one or more interests and activities
in common, and which is organized--that is, some
members lead, others follow, and informal rules and
statuses control social relationships within it.30
The most obvious difference between this and the previous
definition iq that Green uses the term, aggregate, in his
definition. The term, aggregate, usually implies physical
proximity. However, in this instance, Green goes on to
state that the individuals involved do not need to be "in
close physical or social contact.
,31 
He also does not dis-
tinguish social groups from categories and aggregates. Green
thus uses the term to mean a collection of individuals and
not an aggregtte as usually defined by sociologists. While
Green does not mention interaction specifically in the defi-
29
Ibid., p. 30.
30Arnold W. Green, Sociology: An Analysis of Life in




nition, he nevertheless does include the notion of reciprocal
relationships in his discussion of primary and secondary
groups.
32
Finally, he does not explain the manner in which
leaders and followers are present in primary or friendship
groups.
Horton and Hunt
Horton and Hunt do not claim the definition of social
group which they use as their own, but neither do they indi-
cate the source of the definition. In their discussion
of definitions of social group they state, "Another quite
common usage (which your authors prefer) is any number of
persons who share a consciousness of membership and inter-
action.1,33 In the second edition of this text the authors
presented a similar definition but with one exception.
Instead of using the phrase, "any number of persons," as an
indicator of group size, they used the term "aggregate.
In the second edition they did not define aggregates. In
the third edition they define an aggregate as "any physical
collection of people,'' and categories as "a number of people
who share some common characteristic."35 In the third edition
they also distinguish social groups from categories.
32
Ibid., pp. 51-53,
33Paul B. Horton and Chester L. Hunt, Sociology, 3rd
ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 156.
34Idem Sociology, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill,
p. 
174.




In order to define social groups with greater clarity,
Lowry and Rankin first emphasize that social groups are nei-
ther categories nor aggregates. They then state that "the
concept of social group implies interaction between two or
umore individuals.
36
 In the discussion of the meaning of
the definition, they also include the elements of "social
structure" and "goals." In their words,
Groups possess a structure and nature of their our;.
They are not merely the summation of a number of
responding individuals. They have a life history
and purposes and goals.37
Bertrand
Bertrand defines social group in two sections of his
text. The first definition is found in the section dealing
with the difference between social groups and society. Here,
he asserts that
. . . a social group is a social system that involves
some degree ofcooperation among its members for the
attainment of common goals. Furthermore, the members
of a social group are distinguishable from non-members.
The members of a social group have rights and obliga-
tions (social statuses and roles) that non-members do
not have. The social group is thus defined by its
normative structure which differentiates it from
the non-group and from other groups.36
The second definition which occurs in the chapter on grou-
structure and formal organizations omits the element of
36
Ritchie P. Lowry and Robert P. Rankin, Sociology: 
Social Science and Social Concern, 2nd ed. (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1972), P. 15b.
37Ib1d., p. 159.
38Alvin L. Bertrand, Basic Sociology, id ed. (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973), p. 25.
"normative structure but deals with it in detail in the
course of the discussion.39 Bertrand distinguishes social
groups from statistical and societal aggregates. Societal
aggregates are defined so that they resemble what is usually
termed a social category. According to Bertrand, "Societal
aggregates are made up of individuals who are sociologically
perceived as similar in some way.
Biesanz and Biesanz
They conceive of a social group as
. . a plurality of persons (two or more) who interact,
take one another into account, are aware that they have
something significant in common, feel a sense of iden-
tity that sets them off from others, and have social
relationships consisting of interrelated and reciprocal
statuses L4.1
This definition is similar to Green's except that interaction
I s explicitly cited as an element of the definition. Social
group is not only contrasted with aggregates and categories
but it is also specifically stated that they are not groups.
Broom and Selznick
A group is
. . . any collection of persons yho are bound together 
by a distinctive set of social relations. This includes
everything from members of a family; adherents to
Catholicism, or participants in a mob, to citizens of
a national state. Two persons form a group if they are
friends or partners or otherwise held together and Bet 
39Ibid., p. 153.
141)11)4 A p. 157.
41Mavis H. Biesanz and John Biesanz, Introduction to
Sociology, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973),
p. la.
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4?apart from others by their relationship.
Broom and Selznick do not consider "consciousness of kind"
to be an essential element in the social group. They argue
that although similarities exist between members of a group,
the members themselves may not be aware of it. Thus, "similar
life experiences lead to social interaction and the formation
of groups, even though People are not aware of why and how
this takes Place. 43 Within the section dealing with the
definition of social groups, they also define and distinguish
statistical aggregates and social categories.
DeFleur, D'Antonio, and DeFleur
These writers define social group in two places in
their text.144 Both definitions are essentiall: tl'e same.
However, the second definition is much more concise. The
second definition refers to a social group as a "number of
individuals who interact recurrently according to some pattern
of social organization. This pattern includes norms, roles,
social control, and social ranking.'45 Following the first
definition, the authors distinguish between social groups
and social categories. They argue that there is little
42Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, Sociology: A
Text with Readings, 5th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1973),
P. 47.
43Ibid.
44Melvin L. Defleur, William V. D'Antonio, and Lois
B. Defleur, Sociology: Human Society, 2nd ed. (Glenview:
Scott, Foresman & Co., T973), pp. 31, 615.
45Ibid., p. 615.
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difference between a social category and a statistical aggre-
gate. As they state, "Such labels as statistical aggregate,
collectivity, conglomerate, and even Plurel are more or less
.46synonymous with social category.
Dressler and Carnes
This definition of social group immediately follows
the definitions of aggregate and category to which it is
contrasted. According to Dressler and Carnes, "A group
exists when a sense of relatedness is shared by a number
of individuals as a consequence of their interacting or
47having interacted with one another. 1 In the discussion
following the definition, they argue that interaction is
not enough for group formation. A sense of relatedness is
also required. To bolster their assertion, they cite a
hypothetical example of two individuals who meet on a train.
Although the individuals may interact, they do not form a
group until their interaction is oriented to some shared
object or interest. It is only then that 'a rudimentary
feeling of relatedness has been established and these two
individuals have become a group."45
Mack and Pease
Kimball Young was the co-author of the fourth edition
of this text. The definition which is found in this edition
46Ibid., p. 38.
David Dressler and Donald Carnes, Sociology: The
Study of Human Interaction, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1.7973), P. 259.
48Ibid., p. 260.
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is much simpler than the one found in the definition co-au-
thored by Pease.49 The definition which is used in Mack and
Pease is taken from another source. They define a social
group as "a plurality of people 'involved in a pattern of
sociql interaction, conscious of sharing common membership,
of sharing some common understanding, and of accepting some
rights and obligations that accrue only to members.'"5C They
differentiate social groups from social categories but make
no reference to aggregations.
"Mack and Young confine the definition of social
groups to two elements, "two or more persons in interaction"
(Raymond W. Mack and Kimball Young, Sociology and Social 
Life, 4th ed. /New York: American Book Co., 196d 7, p. 24).
71577y- acknowledie that this definition covers a Wide range
of human association and go on to identify several different
types of groups according to their intensity, frequency,
and duration. They include as types of groups, audiences,
crowds, and mobs (ibid., pp. 27-26). The authors call
nongroups, that is, people not in interaction, aggregates.
They define a human aggregate as "people who are classified
together because they share some characteristic but who are
not in interaction" (ibid., p. 32). Among the human aggre-
gates are race, publics, society, and community. In this
author's opinion, it is difficult to see how they can
iiclude community and society as types of aggregates in
which no interaction takes place. Communities and societies
are composed of groups, and groups interact. Mack and Young
appear to qualify themselves somewhat in their definition
of society. A society is "composed of a number of persons
who share a language and a specified territorial boundary
but who, for the most part 7Fsmphasis mine 7 never interact"
(ibid., p. 35). Finally, they include social categories
under the category of human aggregates but the distinction
Is relatively minor. As they state, "A social category is
made UD of persons sharing some innate characteristic which
is socially defined and which therefore alters their life
chances" (ibid., D. 32).
50Raymond W. Mack and John Pease, Sociology and Social
Life, 5th ed. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., ¶ 7 ), p. 43.
This definition is taken from James B. McKee, Introduction
to Sociology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,
1969), p. A  .
bd
Conclusion: Part A
It is evident from the definitions of social group,
which were covered in this section, that some disagreement
exists on which elements are to be included within the
definition. In order to determine the nature and extent of
disagreement on the definition of social group, the def-
initions must be broken down into their constituent elements.
There elements then have to be located within a set of
categories. The set of categories employed must have
utility. It must embrace all of the elements which are
included within the definitions of social group but it
must contain no elements which are not found in the orig-
inal definition. The categories must also be defined in
such a way that the closest possible agreement between
the categories and the elements of the definitions is
achieved. This is the purpose of the following parts. Part
B applies those categories on which Smith and the author
differed to the contemporary sample of definitions of social
group. A selection from Smith's set of categories is made
in order to set off more clearly the areas of disagreement
between Smith and the author and to minimize redundancy in
Part C. Wherever a deficiency is found in one of Smith's
categories, a comparison is made with the author's category
to see if it contains the same deficiency. Part C applies
the author's set of categories to the sample of definitions.
The interpretation of the nature and extent of disagreement
among the definitions will be principally confined to this
89
part. At the conclusion of Part C a final comparison is
made between the set of categories used by Smith and the
set of categories used by the author. Throughout Parts B
and C the reader should refer to Table I which underscores
the diiferences between Smith's and the author's sets of
categories.
Part B: The Application of Smith's Set of
Categories to the Sample of Definitions
In this
applied to the
part only eleven of Smith's categories are
sample of definitions of social group.' The
results of the application of Smith's set of categories are
presented in Tables II and III. A separate section is devoted
to each of Smith's categories. If no definitions can be
-placed under a particular category, an explanation of the
reasons for their omission is given in the section concerned
with that category.
The Largest Set of Two or More Individuals
None of the texts
because none of the texts
is included under this category
cited the category segment of "the
largest set. All of the texts either implicitly or explic-
itly included the element of "two or more individuals."
Those that did not explicitly mention this element (Green,
Vander Zanden, Bierstedt, Mack and Pease, Fichter, Horton
51These categories are: ''the largest set of two or
more individuals," a network of relevant communications,"
"a shared sense of collective identity," "one or more shared
goal dispositions with associated normative strength," "face-
to-face interaction," "norms regarding means," "duration,"
"socioemotional patterns among group members," "mutual need
satisfaction," "intergroup relations and group representative
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FREc./UENCY OF APPEARANCE OF DIFFERENT CATEGORIES
WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF SOCIAL GROUP

































Role Differentiation 45 (10)
TOTAL NUMBER OF TEXTS - 22
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& Hunt, Bell & Sirjamaki, Bertrand, Defleur et al.) use such
terms as "a number of," "a plurality of," "collections of,"
or cite the dyad as the basic group. In addition, all of
the texts refer to persons or human beings. There is no
mention of non-human groups. Therefore, the 21 texts which
cited the element of "two or more individuals" could be placed
under the author's category of the same name but not under
Smith's category, "the largest set of two or more individuals."
A Network of Relevant Communications
Again, no text implied this category because of Smith's
emphasis on both one-way and two-way communication. Fifteen
of the twenty-two texts in the sample explicitly cite
"interaction" as an element in the definition of social
group. Those that do not explicitly cite this element (Cuber,
Green, Vander Zanden, Fichter, Broom & Selznick, Wilson,
Bertrand) instead use the terms "reciprocal communication,"
"relationships," and "contact and cooperation." Throughout
the texts, there is always at least the implication of two-
way communication but no implication of one-way communication.
Thus, the author's category of "interaction," which under-
scores two-way communication, is more closely in alignment
with the sample of definitions.
A Shared Sense of Collective Identity
This category is also not cited by the texts in the
same sense as that used by Smith. Building on his state-
ment about the possibility of one-way relationships, Smith
had added that a member of a group must merely believe "that
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there is at least one other individual in space-time who
also views himself as a member of the same collective
entity and who in turn believes in the existence of other
members.
u52 In order to explain the difficulties inherent
in this category, a hypothetical example of a group made
up of a living and a dead member will be used. The above
example is consistent with Smith's notion that a group can
exist whose members are widely separated in space-time. If
communication in this group is one-way, then how can the
deceased individual recognize himself as a member of the
same collective entity as the living individual Secondly,
Smith's emphasis on belief does not permit the use of any
of the definitions of social group in this category. In
Smith's view, a member of the group does not have to know
another individual who recognizes nimself as a member of
the same collective entity. It is only required that he
believes in the existence of such an individual. All of
the texts which cited this element (see Tables IV and V)
spoke of simultaneously existing individuals who know an-
other member of the same collective entity. This is the
same sense in which the author's category, "a shared sense
of collective identity," is used. Smith's category of the
same name goes beyond the notion contained in the text def-
initions by including the elements of belief and individuals
widely separated in space-time. In addition, five of the
52David Horton Smith, "A Parsimonious Definition of
'Group:' Toward Conceptual Clarity and Scientific Utility,"
Sociological Inquiry 37 (Spring 1967): 147.
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sixteen texts (Vander Zanden, Ogburn & Nimkoff, Bierstedt,
Make & ?ease, Horton & Hunt) specifically cite "consciousness
of kind" which is included within the author's category.
One or More hared Goal Dispositions with
Associated Normative Strength
and Norms Regarding Means
The author's category used the same title as did
Smith. However, Smith's category of "norms regarding means"
was deleted and used within the author's category of "one
or more shared goal dispositions." In the author's opinion,
goals or ends logically imply the existence of the means
to attain them. Tables II and III reveal that of the four-
teen texts which employed the category of "goal dispositions'
in their definition of social group, nine also contained the
element of "norms regarding means." The remaining texts
(Ogburn & Nimkoff, Merrill, Wilson, Lowry & Rankin, Mack
& Pease) link norms and social groups either in different
chapters of sections. Although Smith separated the two
categories, the sample of definitions indicates that they
are connected. The incorporation of the category "norms
regarding means" within the category "goal dispositions"
serves to simplify the analysis and still accurately relates
the meaning of the definitions.
Role Differentiation and Intergroup Relations
and Group Representative Roles
Like Smith, the author also uses the category "role
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differentiation. However, the author's category "role
differentiation " embodies the category "intergroup rela-
tions." The four texts (Lundberg et al., Fichter, Green,
Biesanz & Biesanz) which cite "intergroup relations" as an
element also cite "role differentiation." With the excep-
tion of Lundberg et al., those texts which list both of these
also include a greater number of elements in their definition.
Therefore, it is the author's contention that the categories
"role differentiation" and "intergroup relations" do not
reflect a real difference in definitions but only a differ-
ence in the explicitness of the definitions.
Duration
Although there is no disagreement between qmith and
the author on the nature of this category, it is included
in this part because of an assumption which the author
made. The author decided to add the category of "social
structure" on the assumption that those texts which employed
"duration" in their definition would also employ "social
structure." This assumption is not substantiated. Rose
and Rose cite "duration" but do not also include the author's
category "social structure." Nevertheless, this category
is retained by the author on the basis of its use, since
twelve texts do include it as an element in their definition.
Face-to-Face Interaction, Socioemotional Patterns
Among Group Members, and Mutual Need Satisfaction
No text cited "face-to-face interaction" as an element
in the definition of social group. In every instance, this
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element was used in the definition of primary groups. Addi-
tionally, there was no mention of "socioemotional patterns
among group members' or "mutual need satisfaction." These
elements were also cited principally in the discussion of
primary groups. All three of these categories are excluded
from the author's set of categories.
Conclusion: Part B
Throughout this part, an analysis has been made of
the application of Smith's set of categories to the defini-
tions of social group found in the sample of introductory
texts. The deficiencies which the author found in attempting
to apply Smith's set of categories have been noted. Tables
IT and III reveal that eight of the 22 texts did not fit
Smith's set of categories. Six of the eleven categories
on which Smith and the author differed were not cited by
any text in the sample. Thus, support has been found for
the modifications, additions, and deletions which the author
made in deriving his own set of categories from Smith's set
of categories. In Part C the author's set of categories
alone will be applied to the definitions of social group.
Part C: The Application of the Author's Set of
Categories to the Sample of Definitions
Tables IV and V present the results of the application
of the author's set of categories to the definitions of
social group. It should be kept in mind that each of the
categories of "Action," -Duration," and '!External Perception
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TOTAL NUMBER OF TEXTS - 22
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Smith (see Table I). The analysis in this part will be con-
fined mainly to the determination of the extent of agreement
and disagreement on the nature of social group. However, the
conclusion will again compare Smith's and the author's sets
of categories for the analysis of definitions of social
group.
All of the texts include the category of "two or
more individuals" either explicitly or implicitly in the
definitions of social group. While Wilson does not explic-
itly cite this category in his definition, he does state
that individuals are necessary for a group to exist. Com-
plete unanimity is plso achieved on the inclusion of the
element of interaction.
The most frequently cited category is "a shared sense
of collective identity. Of the five texts which did not
cite this element, two (Cuber and McNall) cite only indivi-
duals and interaction as essential to social groups. The
three remaining texts (Wilson, Lowry & Rankin, DeFleur et
al.) cite "shared goal dispositions" as a third element.
"Shared goal dispositioneis cited by fourteen of the texts.
Omitting Cuber and McNall, all those texts which did not
include this category did include the category "a shared
sense of collective identity."
The categories "role differentiation" and social
structure appear to be linked. Eight of the ten texts
which cite "role differentiation also cite "social struc-
ture" as an element in the definition. With the exception
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of Rose and Rose, if we combine the texts including either
"role differentiation" or "social structure" as categories,
we then have the same texts which cite "shared goal dispo-
sitions" as a category in the definition of social group.
Of the five texts which cite "duration" as a category,
two (Green, Rose & Rose) do not discuss the reason for its
Inclusion elsewhere in their texts. Fichter cites this
category as "one of the most important marks distinguishing
a social group from a transient aggregate.'63 Finally, two
texts (Merrill, DeFleur et al.) include this category as an
element in the development of social structure.
Only one text (Fichter) cited "action" and "external
perception of group membership" within the definition of
social group. The text emphasizes action on both the indi-
vidual and group level. It contends that social groups "are
knowable, that is, it is possible to find out about them. -
Twelve of the 22 texts distinguish social groups from
aggregates and categories. One text (Toby) distinguishes them
from categories only. One text (Lowry & Rankin) distinguishes
social groups from statistical aggregates and statistical
categories. One text (Vander Zanden) distinguishes social
groups from statistical and social categories and another
(Bertrand) from statistical and societal aggregates. Finally,
five texts (Merrill, Bierstedt, Rose & Rose, Green, McNall)
did not cite aggregates or categories.
53Fichter, Sociology, p. lub.
54 Ibid., p. 107.
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Conclusion: Part C
David Horton Smith's article emphasized the importance
of the elements of group size, a communication network, a
shared collective identity, and goal orientations as essen-
tial to social groups.55 The analysis which has just been
accomplished provides some support for this definition but
with certain qualifications. These modifications were dis-
cussed in Part B.
If the category "the largest set of two or more indi-
viduals " is changed to "two or more individuals" and if only
human individuals are included then complete unanimity on
this category is found. It cannot be denied that grouplike
behavior occurs among non-human individuals. However, it
may be argued that this behavior is instinctual rather than
learned. Among the sociologists investigated, the definition
was confined to human individuals alone.
Smith states in his discussion of the category "a
network of relevant communications " that it is not necessary
. . . that the communication be two-way for a group
to exist, this again permits members who are widely
separated in space-time or who are reacting to a
commonly perceived event or message without ever
having had any 9pportunity for feedback communication
to the source.5°
This assertion does not receive support from the sample of
definitions of social group. Rather the emphasis is on
feedback communication or interaction alone. The substi-




tution of the author's category "interaction " for "a
network of relevant communications" leads to the finding
of complete agreement on its inclusion within the definition
of social group.
Using the author's category "a shared sense of collec-
tive identity" which incorporates the notion of mutual recog-
nition by simultaneously existing individuals, one finds that
sixteen of the texts cite this as an element. Incorporating
Smith's category of "norms regarding means" within the
author's category "one or more shared goal dispositions with
associated normative strength" in no way affects the support
which this category receives. Of the remaining categories,
only the categories "social structure" and "role differentia-
tion " receive any kind of consistent support from the
definitions in the sample.
The use of the author's set of categories suggests
a modified version of Smith's definition of social group.
A social group is two or more individuals in interaction who 
possess a  shared sense of collective identit. and one or more
shared goal dispositions. While this modified definition
has received support from the sample of texts, the author
agrees with Smith that research must be done which "will
permit determination of whether grouplike phenomena are





The purpose of this chapter is to present a final
summation of Smith's and the author's positions on their sets
of categories for the analysis of social group definitions.
In order to avoid redundancy and to increase clarity, this
chapter focuses primarily on the basic positions of Smith
and the author and not on the sets of categories themselves.
Smith's set of categories contains three positions which
the author does not accept: (1) The inclusion of non-human
individuals; (2) all individuals in space-time, and (3) one-
way communication. These positions are incorporated within
his set of categories and his definition of social group.
The author includes only human individuals in his
set of catego.cies because the existence of non-human social
groups has yet to be sufficiently demonstrated.
1
Based on
his assumption that a complete group contains all indivi-
duals in space-time, Smith argues that it is difficult to
know when a group no longer exists. In his words,
The fact that there are no living members of a given
group is supportinE evidence for its death, but not
1
Konrad Lorenz argues for the existence of non-
human social groups in On Aggression (New York: Bantam
Books, 1969), pp. 159-211. However, he does not ade-
quately prove that the behavior of non-human forms mani-




conclusive evidence, since at any future time (as
long as there are living organisms) one or more
individuals may join. • • • Thus a current group
is a temporal cross-section and should not be con-
fused with the group as a whole.'
If Smith's argument is taken to its logical conclusion,
then it appears that sociologists never study complete groups
since they can never know who may become a group member in
the distant future. Because the subject matter of any
science is directly or indirectly ctservable phenomena, the
author confines group membership to contemporaneous indivi-
duals. The author also agrees with Warriner that if groups
are real so are their components.
3
Throughout his article, Smith emphasizes that two-way
communication is not essential to group formation and main-
tenance. According to Smith,
The most extreme example /75f a group possessing only
one-way communication 7 might be that of a secret
religious group or organization that attracted members
by one-way communication through a written tract which
enjoined anyone who became a group member to do good
works in sccord with the religion but without ever
revealing his group membership to anyone.4
The author does not agree that this example is a social
group. There are no reciprocal relations or exchange of
meaningful gestures or symbols. Individuals respond to the
religious tract and act as if no other individuals who possess
-̀David Horton Smith, "A Parsimonious Definition of
'Group:' Toward Conceptual Clarity and Scientific Utility,"
Sociological Inquiry 37 (spring 1967): 156.
3Charles K. Warriner, "Groups are Real: A Reaffirm-
ation," American Sociological Review ?1 (October 1956):
549-554.
4Smith, "Parsimonious Definition of 'Group'": 156.
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the same goal orientations exist. Response takes place
within the individual and action is confined to those who
are unaware of the individual's "group" affiliation. Thus,
there is no interaction. Throughout this paper, the author
has emphasized "interaction" as defined by Theodorson and
Theodorson:
The basic social process represented in communication
and a mutual relationship between two or more indivi-
duals (or groups). Interaction between persons is
social behavior. Through language, symbols, and ges-
tures people exchange meEnings and have a reciprocal
effect upon each other's behavior, expectations, and
thought.
In the author's opinion it is reciprocal relations and
communication which make a group. Because of Smith's
three positions mentioned above, none of the conceptions
of social group of the early European and American sociolo-
gists who were studied nor any of the social group defini-
tions from the sample of introductory sociology texts (1964.-
1973) could be placed under Smith's categories of "the
largest set of two or more individuals," "a network of
relevant communications," or "a shared sense of collective
identity." All of the early European and American sociolo-
gists' conceptions of social group and all of the social
group definitions from the sample of texts fit the author's
categories "two or more individuals" and "interaction."
Five of the thirteen conceptions of social group of the
early European and American sociologists who were studied and
5George A. Theodorson and Achilles G. Theodorson,
Modern Dictionary of Sociology (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell
Co., 1969), p. 211.
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sixteen of the sample of 22 text definitions of social group
were included under the author's category of "a shared sense
of collective identity.
The second area of disagreement between Smith and the
author centers around the problem of parsimony. Smith used
separate categories for the notions of "goal dispositions,"
norms," "the division of labor," and "leaders and followers.
It is the author's position that Smith's use of these notions
in separate categories is redundant. For this reason, the
author placed Smith's notions of 'goal dispositions" and
"norms" within his category of "shared goal dispositions"
and Smith's notions of 'the division of labor" and "leaders
and followers" within his category "role differentiation"
(see Pp. 14-15). The author's position has received some
support from the conceptions of social group of the early
European and American sociologists who were studied and
the sample of introductory sociology text definitions
which were analyzed in the previous chapters.7
The third area of disagreement between Smith and the
author concerns the use of what, in the author's opinion,
6
These notions are found in Smith's categories, "shared
goal dispositions," 'norms reg,rding means," "role differen-
tiation," and "intergroup relat.:ons and group representative
roles" respectively.
7All of the conceptions of social group of the early
European and American sociologists who were studied that
emphasize "shared goal dispositions" and "role differentiation,"
also emphasize "norms regarding 1_,ans" and "intergroup rela-
tions and group representative roles" respectively. Nine of
the fourteen texts which cite "shared t,oal dispositions" also
cite "norms regarding means," and four of the ten texts which
cite "role differentiation" also cite intergroup relations and
group representative roles."
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are non-essential categories: "face-to-face interaction,"
-socioemotional patterns among group members," and "mutual
need satisfaction." Because none of the conceptions of social
group of the early European and American sociologists who
were studied and none of the introductory sociology text
definitions in the sample cite these categories, the author's
position received support. The author does not maintain
that the elements contained in Smith's categories do not
occur in some social groups, but simply that they do not
occur in all social groups.
The final area of disagreement between Smith and the
author concerns the absence of a category in Smith's set of
categories corresponding to the notion of "social structure."
The author argued that those authors who cited 'duration"
would also cite Ifsocial structure. While this argument
did not receive support from the conceptions of the early
European and American sociologists who were studied or the
sample of social group definitions, it was nevertheless
cited in two of the early European sociologists' conceptions
of social group, two of the early American sociologists'
conceptions of social group and the definitions of social
group in ten of the 22 introductory sociology texts which
were sampled.
The purpose of this paper has not been to invalidate
r-rlith's definition of social group or his set of categories
for the analysis of definitions of social group. Rather the
attempt nas been to compare smith's and the author's sets of
categories to determine which has the greater utility. A
1 1 0
useful set of categories can serve as an accurate indicator
of the maturity of the discipline. This paper also makes a
contribution to the development of the discipline by pre-
senting the reader with another perspective for the analysis
of social group definitions. The author agrees with George
Simpson who states:
It must be recognized that, given the kind of data with
which the social sciences deal, disagreement is not only
healthy but altogether necessary, indeed indispensable.
From this welter of complexity and dispute every social
scientist worth his salt soon learns the significance
of a point of view, that is, of holding to a conceptual
scheme and a frame of reference even though they may be
different from those of his fellows, for it is from
differing points of view that social science has made most
progress. Over the long term and sometimes even over the
short term, certain points of view show themselves as
partial or incapable of explaining the phenomena they
purport to encompass. This failure, resulting from a
meagerness of conceptual scheme or frame of reference
and the dissatisfactiop stemming from it, finally
result in advancement.°
The ultimate value of this work can be determined only by
the utility of the author's set of categories for the analysis
of definitions of social group in further analyses of the
concept.
8
George Simpson, Man in Society: Preface to $ociology 
and the Social Sciences (New York: Hanoi= House, 1954), P. 13.
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